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Methodology: 
 
This evaluation was conducted and written by an external consultant 1 between April and May 2001.  
The evaluation consisted of direct observation of all aspects of the programme and numerous interviews 
by the consultant of key staff within and outside HI. In addition 19 case studies based on semi-
structured interviews were compiled and form annex A.. A total of 1113 individual interviews with pre-
tested questionnaires were carried out in the 5 target provinces and the 41 target districts. These 
questionnaires targeted different groups in different communities, as is explained in the report. Copies 
of these questionnaires can be found in the annexes. The design of the evaluation by the consultant 
was based on the Terms of References for the evaluation and can be found as annex D. Existing HI 
national staff (supervisors) conducted  the questionnaire survey , the national data staff at the Kandahar 
office entered the data prior to analysis. All questionnaire results and statistical tabulations (Excel) have 
been left with HI office in Afghanistan. 
 
Introduction to CBMAP (overview): 
 
Briefly, the HI community based mine awareness programme (CBMAP) is a programme that began in 
southern Afghanistan in 1996 in order to establish sustainable and appropriate mine awareness to rural 
communities at high risk to mines and UXO. The central vehicle used to disseminate mine awareness 
information is locally recruited staff (Nomaindas) who conduct direct mine awareness training as well as 
identify and train mine committees (MCs) as village volunteers to maintain and reiterate the mine 
awareness message. It is a pyramidal  structure  from HI trainers to these Nomaindas and then to the 
many MC at the village level. The programme has grown considerably over the years and not only 
transfers information to reduce accidents but also collects information from the villages (through the 
MCs) concerning UXO, mine injury data and new previously unidentified minefields. The community 
based approach with unpaid volunteers was innovative when it began and appears to be effective. 
Working in 5 provinces in 2001 and 41 districts of high risk, and expanding every year, the programme 
has never been evaluated. This evaluation was commissioned by HI Belgium . 
                                                          
1 Chris Horwood 





This report considers the CBMAP to have established an conceptual approach and operational structure 
that allows mine awareness to be highly sustainable in a target area and among population groups of a 
considerable size. The programme is culturally and socially appropriate in design and its structure 
allows a single community-based Nomainda ( HI staff representative) to monitor and interface with a 
large number of  volunteer mine committees (MCs). While the statistics do not allow us to draw a direct 
correlation between mine awareness dissemination and reduced injury levels there is substantial  
statistical and circumstantial information to suggest that people in HI’s areas are more ‘mine smart’ and 
have changed reduced risk-taking activities to some degree. Data in this report will illustrate this. 
 
Handicap’s CBMAP pyramidal structure takes time and resources to set up , but once it is functioning it 
has a immense capacity to deliver mine awareness to an ever increasing number of affected 
communities. Due to ‘economies of scale’ and the capacity of the Nomaindas to create and monitor 
large numbers of mine committees, the CBMAP can continue to offer its benefits to an increasing 
number of people at a decreasing cost per capita ( i.e. person trained).  
 
Mine awareness seeks to reduce dangerous and risk-taking practises through the teaching of ‘mine 
smart’ knowledge: as long as there are mines and UXO this is a damage limitation exercise and not a 
damage control exercise. There will never be the perfect mine awareness programme but a community 
based, voluntary and self-sustaining network of trainer and information collectors is a significant 
achievement that deserves recognition. This evaluation finds this approach to be the most appropriate 
currently in use in Afghanistan in terms of pedagogical approach and sustainability. 
 
The volunteer network in many hundreds of villages in affected areas gives HI a  high capacity for 
valuable information transfer :The secondary benefits of the community based network enables HI to 
collect, on a regular basis, important data concerning mine victims, previously unidentified minefields 
and location of UXO. Such a system would be costly to establish independently and should be valued 
as a major output of the programme. If and when this data is  managed in a more effective way it should 
offer considerable added value to the mine action sector in Afghanistan . Despite the disappointing 
standard of victim data collection nationally , but also within HI’s programme, HI is well placed to 
improve the data collected in its regions substantially as well as take a lead nationally. In this regard HI 
should vigorously promote the establishment of the national data collection plan as laid out in the 
AMVIS proposal written in 2000. 
 
The CBMAP system is evaluated to be  appropriate to facilitate a long term or short term involvement by 
HI. They have set up a low cost system that requires low staff and low maintenance.  In terms of 
sustainability 98% of MCs interviewed indicated that they would continue to act as the mine committee 
when HIs support and involvement in their communities curtailed 
 
HIs relative negligence in developing a strategy to create a community based volunteer system among 
the most vulnerable sections of  the population (Kuchi nomads) represents a missed opportunity that 
can and should be rectified immediately.  
 
Another area of weakness highlighted in this evaluation is the method used for village and MC selection 
at the district level. The survey results indicate a high number of villages, that currently do not receive 
mine awareness through an MC, consider themselves exposed to high risk. This too needs to be 
addressed immediately. In addition to this the study identified the need for further attention by CBMAP 
to the exact coverage capacity of MCs within their villages. Some evidence suggests that some of the 
MCs do not reach a large proportion of their village population. 
 
 
External Evaluation  of HI Community-based Mine Awareness Programme (May 2001)                                  4 
HI is already using the BBC programmes as a vehicle for mine awareness ‘radio forum’ in their project 
area to considerable effect. This evaluation recommends that they greatly expand their promotion 
(through providing radios) and harness the power of this available and popular resource. 
 
HI has always worked closely with the UN Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan. HI’s link through the 
Regional MAPA offices has enabled ammunition reports generated from their community-based 
information to be partially addressed . But due to the high number of requests generated there has been 
an urgent need for more EOD teams. HI’s current plan to develop 2 new EOD teams in 2001 is 
commendable, if not overdue. 
 
In terms of strategic planning and organisational ‘vision’ this evaluation recommends HIB to consider all 
possible mine action options when seeking to address the needs of mine risk communities and not 
restrict itself to mine awareness. The recent development of 2 EOD teams is a positive development. It 
is recommended that the progress of AREA (innovative and successful community-based demining 
agency in Afghanistan) be studied by HI and that a possible adoption of a similar approach be 
considered in Southern Afghanistan. 
 
Despite the relatively large number of agencies working in mine action in Afghanistan, it is a huge 
country with major geographical, political and climatic constraints. A large number of people continue to 
be directly affected by landmines and UXO both economically, social and physically (with high numbers 
of casualties) even after 12 years of mine action operations. This evaluation commends the CBMAP for 
the success of its programme and contributions made to reducing the threat , but also encourages HI to 
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1.0 Impact Evaluation. 
 
1. 1 Achievements as set against stated goals, aims and objectives. 
As expressed in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation the two overall objectives of this program 
are: 
 To reduce instances of mine/UXO accidents among civilian populations in rural communities of 
southern Afghanistan, through direct and indirect mine awareness training.  
 To develop mine awareness in communities and create a sustainable mine awareness capacity, 
which endures once the project is finished. 
 
Although this evaluation is designed to comment on CBMAP since its inception (1996) the 
evaluation itself is mostly funded as part of the project activities under the current contract with 
the EC Commission as part of the consortium led by the NGO, MADERA. As expressed in the 
Aug 1999 contract between HIB and the European Union the goal and project purpose are 
expressed as follows: 
 
The goal of this programme is to arrive within a period of 24 months to a reduction of mines 
accidents through the development of mine awareness within rural communities and  the 
creation of a sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network that will 
continue after the end of the project. 
 
Specifically, the project will have the following results: 
200,000 villagers trained to Mine Awareness (villagers and nomads) 
400 Mine Committees created in focus districts and provinces 
600 unexploded ordnance reports collected in focus districts and provinces. 
 
Findings of 1.1   Achievements as set against stated goals, aims and objectives. 
 
Specific results  
With respect to these specific results the CBMAP has, between August 1999 and April 2001 (two 
months short of the contract period with the EC) : 
 Trained (direct and indirect) in mine awareness over 736, 000 villagers and pastoral nomads 
(Kuchie). This is an over achievement of 350% above the target number. 
 Created 542 new mine committee. This is an over achievement of 135% above the target level. 
 Documented and collected 1664 ammunition reports from affected villages. An over achievement of  
277%. 
These achievements are very commendable and illustrate that the system in place to achieve these 
different project output are working well and to far higher levels than expected. Possibly they also show 
that HI set their targets low or are not aware themselves of the capacity of their system to generate 
these results. It should be clear that these levels of achievement will probably not be repeated in the 
future in the same areas: There will be a finite limit to how many Mine Committees (MCs) a province 
needs and how many people need training. Equally there will be a limit to how many ammunition reports 
HI will receive from the same areas over time.  
 
Reducing mine incidents 
With respect to the stated goal of reducing mine incidents in the project area it must be said that 
seeking to establish a direct correlation between changes in mine/UXO incidents and mine awareness 
dissemination is problematic and misleading. By isolating mine awareness training as a single factor 
affecting mine/UXO incidents this evaluation would be ignoring the fact that mine / UXO incidents are 
the result of a complex interplay of physical, seasonal and attitudinal factors. There are serious limiting 
factors in assessing this objective. This has also been found to be the case in other countries where an 
evaluation of mine awareness impact has been attempted as well as in a previous national mine 
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awareness evaluation (CIET 1998) in Afghanistan. Nevertheless some findings concerning this central 
CBMAP objective and these can be found below in section 1.4. 
 
Sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network 
Concerning the creation of a sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network, the 
programme has developed an approach that has proved to be sustainable (to date) and has resulted in 
an effective mine information network that almost entirely covers mine affected districts of southern  
Afghanistan, including Ghazni to the east and Farah to the west. In addition it appears that the network 
of information gathering and mine awareness dissemination will be sustainable in the long term due to 
the structure of the CBMAP and the particular social and cultural conditions of rural Afghanistan. This is 
discussed throughout the report and particularly section 3. 
 
Information transfer network 
Currently the programme covers hundreds of villages in 38 districts in the five provinces. Three districts 
regarded as mine affected and needing mine awareness (according to HI’s internal needs assessment) 
are not yet covered.2 The network of mine committees continues to grow every month increasing 
CBMAP’s coverage. The approach currently used for this information transfer from HI to villagers (i.e. 
mine awareness) and from villagers to the mine action community ( victim data and munitions reports 
via HI) is judged to be an extraordinarily effective network in terms of reaching a large amount of rural 
people through a relatively low-cost and low-maintenance staffing structure. The details of the level of 
effectiveness of this mine awareness approach, and the substance, reliability and end use of the 
information network is evaluated in various sections below. 
 
1.2 Comparison between villages covered by the project and those not covered. 
 
As explained in the ‘Methodology’ section village questionnaires were used were used in randomly 
selected villages evenly spread across the 41 districts of the 5 provinces of Handicap’s area of 
activities. 
These 1113 individual interviews (377 adults / 736 children) contain a wide range of  information which 
provides the statistical backbone of this evaluation and more  detailed information that may be useful to 
HI at a latter date for planning and prioritisation etc. Additionally they could provide a baseline database 
for further evaluation at a later data to monitor the progress and effectiveness of their programme in 
these selected villages. 
 
1.2.1 Statistical comparison between villages in terms of ‘mine smart’3 knowledge: 
Examples of all questionnaires can be found in the annexes. 
 
Questionnaire 1a: 
The adults in villages where CBMAP operates (either with direct or indirect training) answered all 
questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 91% . In response to a group 
of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper with mines or UXO’ 
messages, 94% of adults responded correctly. In response to a group of more difficult questions 
concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and what to do if you 
find yourself in a minefield’, the adults answered 88% correctly.4 
 
                                                          
2 One district in Kandahar province where HI has repeatedly failed to recruit a reliable representative, 
and 2 other districts in Farah which are so far from the provincial capital that logistical considerations 
have prevented CBMAP establishing representatives. 
3
 A useful term used in the 1998 CIET evaluation of mine awareness in Afghanistan referring to the 
level of knowledge concerning the essential safety and advice messages of mine awareness 
programmes. 
4
 ‘Correctly’ here does not mean the answered every point of every question correctly but that in each 
question they answered enough points to show that they were ‘mine smart’ by this evaluations’ 
standard. 
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Questionnaire 1b: 
The children (65% boys / 35% girls) in villages where CBMAP operates (either with direct or indirect 
training) answered all questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 84% . 
In response to a group of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper 
with mines or UXO’ messages, 95% of children responded correctly. In response to a group of more 
difficult questions concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and 
what to do if you find yourself in a minefield’, the children answered 73% correctly. These children were 




The adults in villages where CBMAP does not operate answered all questions relating to ‘mine 
smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 70% . In response to a group of simple questions 
concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper with mines or UXO’ messages, 79% of adults 
responded correctly. In response to a group of more difficult questions concerning ‘recognition of mined 
areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and what to do if you find yourself in a minefield’, the 
adults answered 61% correctly. These adults were particularly weak concerning the question of 
recognition of a typically mined area, only 33% answering correctly. 
(Of interest, 74% of these adults interviewed claimed to have had some form of one-off mine awareness 
training at some point in the last few years, but not from HI.) 
 
Questionnaire 2b: 
The children ( 63% boys / 36% girls) in villages where CBMAP does not operate answered all 
questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 53% . In response to a group 
of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper with mines or UXO’ 
messages, 75% of these children responded correctly. In response to a group of more difficult questions 
concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and what to do if you 
find yourself in a minefield’, only 32% of the children answered correctly. 
 
Questionnaire 3a: 
The adults kuchies interviewed in encampments where CBMAP does not have mine committees 
answered all questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an overall level of 73% . In 
response to a group of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t handle and don’t tamper with 
mines or UXO’ messages, 76% of kuchi adults responded correctly. In response to a group of more 
difficult questions concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, mine signs, precautions and 
what to do if you find yourself in a minefield’, the adults answered 70% correctly. . Of those questioned 
in this category (kuchi adults) 61% said that they had had mine awareness before. 59 % of these 
indicated it was from an HI Nomainda.(over a quarter of those interviewed). 
 
Questionnaire 3b: 
The kuchie children (54% boys / 46% girls) interviewed in encampments where CBMAP does not 
have mine committees answered all questions relating to ‘mine smart’ knowledge correctly to an 
overall level of 65% . In response to a group of simple questions concerning the ‘don’t touch, don’t 
handle and don’t tamper with mines or UXO’ messages, 81% of these children responded correctly. In 
response to a group of more difficult questions concerning ‘recognition of mined areas, mine marking, 
mine signs, precautions and what to do if you find yourself in a minefield’, the kuchi children answered 
49% correctly. Of those questioned in this category (kuchi children) 53% said that they had had mine 
awareness before. 50 % of these said it was from an HI Nomainda.(approximately a quarter of those 
interviewed). 
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Percentile breakdown of ‘mine 
smart’ responses to 1113 
questionnaires to different 
communities in 41 districts in 5 




























Sample size (total 1113) 210 419 91 173 76 144 
 
Proportion correctly answering 
simple ‘don’t touch’ questions 
 
94% 95% 79% 75% 76% 81% 
Proportion answering correctly 
more specific mine awareness 
questions. 
 
88% 73% 61% 32% 70% 49% 
Proportion correctly answering 
‘mine smart’ questions overall. 
(i.e. both categories above) 
91% 84% 70% 53% 73% 65% 
       
 
N.B. Generally it is wise to be cautious drawing too many conclusions from data drawn from questionnaires. Some 
people (especially children) may have not correctly understood the questions, or the questions themselves may 
not have been designed well enough to elicit the full knowledge of the interviewee etc. All questionnaires are 
included in English in the annexes. 
 
Findings of 1.2.1: Statistical comparison between villages in terms of ‘mine smart’5 knowledge 
 
 In terms of ‘mine smart’ knowledge, based on the key, repeated messages of CBMAP, those 
villagers within Handicap’s mine awareness programme clearly have a higher knowledge than 
those outside the programme. The kuchi , some of whom had received some direct training scored 
a little higher than those communities that had received no training at all. 
 
 Many of the questions relating to mine awareness in general are common sense and therefore it is 
not surprising that those not trained by the CBMAP still scored relatively highly overall (70%) on 
mine awareness questions. ( e.g. When asked whether ‘there is ever a situation where it is good to 
touch a mine.’ extremely few people would respond to the affirmative whether they had been 
trained or not!) 
 
 It is pertinent that those villagers outside of CBMAP activities scored lower on the more demanding 
questions concerning recognition of minefields, how to recognise mine marking, natural signs and 
what are the safest activities when you find yourself in an unknown or mined area. The mine smart 
knowledge concerning these kinds of questions require a range of responses and need to be taught 
for people to be aware of them. Where HI has been training the knowledge is significantly higher on 
these issues, particularly when comparing the children. 
 
 We can conclude that the statistics from the results of the questionnaires illustrate that adults and 
children within CBMAP possess significantly more ‘mine smart’ knowledge.  This is a positive 
affirmation of the programmes success in transferring ‘mine smart’ knowledge. It does not , 
however, illustrate to what level this knowledge may  influences changes away from risk-taking 
behaviour. 
                                                          
5
 A useful term used in the 1998 CIET evaluation of mine awareness in Afghanistan referring to the 
level of knowledge concerning the essential safety and advice messages of mine awareness 
programmes. 
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1.2.2 Gender separation and comments 
 
All Nomainda and mine committees are male. Anyone familiar with the culture of Afghanistan (now more 
rigorously enforced by the Taleban regime) makes the training in women and girls above puberty very 
difficult. This is not the case among the kuchies where women enjoy more freedom and can, in most 
cases, attend mine awareness training. This is illustrated by the records that show a far larger number 
of kuchi women and girls attending mine awareness trainings  than in settled villagers. (see table 2). 
Generally females (due to their restricted movements outside of their home) are far less exposed to risk 
than male. Again, the kuchi women are different as they are exposed to far greater mobility and freedom 
among the camps and during their nomadic travels. 
 
The use of women in the training teams is virtually impossible. The Taleban have banned the use of 
women as paid workers in NGOs unless they are directly involved in health work. HI has taken the 
position of accepting the current parameters in Afghanistan and despite considering ideas to develop 
husband and wife teams of MC they have not implemented the concept to date. The two main reasons 
is that the female MC would not be able to be monitored by anyone except her husband, and they fear 
that if they upset the authorities on this issue they could jeopardise their whole programme. As long as 
the proportion of female casualties remains low (under 6% females over the age of 17yrs6) they feel this 
approach is justified and this evaluation concurs. 
 
Despite these conditions this evaluation considers it important that HI strives to present trainings to girls 
and women. HI do have high access to girls who are, after all, tomorrow’s women. CBMAP have 
documented the training of a total of 55,184 women in direct and indirect (including radio forums) since 
1996.  51% of these were kuchie attendees. Since 1996 they have documented the training of 149,491 
girls of whom 30% were kuchie girls. The female trainees therefore represent  only 16.4% of all people 
trained by CBMAP. Adult women only represent 4% of all people trained between 1996 and April 2001. 
This is shown in table 2 below. In general the only way village women receive training is if they are 
related in some way to the Nomainda or MC and therefore he is able to gain access to the compound or 
home where women live. Older women can sometimes freely participate in trainings with children and 
men in trainings outside of their home. Apart from this there are no ways for the Nomainda or MC to 
have contact or train village women. The situation in the kuchi camps is more liberal as the statistics 
indicate. 
 
Table  No 2. Sexual and age division of trainees recorded by CBMAP  (1996-Apr 2001). 
 
Direct, indirect 
and radio forum 
training attendees 
(incl kuchi) 
MEN WOMEN BOYS GIRLS TOTAL 
Total trained by 
CMAP since 1996 
430,586 55,184 609,066 149,491 1,244,327 
Percentile of 
total 
34.6% 4.4% 49% 12% 100% 
  
In the case studies in certain villages the men said they would inform their wives about mine awareness 
themselves and therefore it was unnecessary for women to have direct training from outsiders or even 
the MCs. The HI staff clam that this attitude is fairly universal. CBMAP has far greater access to the 
younger generation of boys and girls although boys, again, have more freedom and mobility away from 
their homes than girls. The fact that those conducting the interviews found it difficult to interview an 
equal number of boys to girls for this evaluation is further evidence of this fact. (see sample size 
differences). A clear exception to this being the kuchi where they interviewed almost the same amount 
                                                          
6
 Based on data of 788 accidents since 1996 recorded by CBMAP. ICRC’s data show a similarly low 
level for women. 
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of boys to girls.) The following table displays the gender breakdown between boys and girls and their 
level of ‘mine smart’ knowledge: 
 
Table No 3. Gender comparison;  ‘Mine smart’ knowledge between boys and girls: 
 
 
Percentile breakdown of ‘mine 
smart’ responses to 736 
questionnaires to boys and girls 
in different communities in 41 




























Sample size (total 736) 273 146 111 62 78 66 
 
Proportion correctly answering 
simple ‘don’t touch’ questions 
 
96% 92% 79% 70% 80% 83% 
Proportion answering correctly 
more specific mine awareness 
questions. 
 
71% 55% 38% 21% 51% 45% 
Proportion correctly answering 
‘mine smart’ questions overall. 
(i.e. both categories above) 
84% 74% 59% 46% 66% 64% 
       
 
Findings  from the statistics: 
 
There is a clear difference between the ‘mine smart’ knowledge between boys and girls whether they 
attend mine awareness training or not. Boys are more ‘mine smart’, (or at least were able to answer the 
questions with more confidence than the girls interviewed). There may be cultural and psychological 
issues here concerning girls’ expectations and motivation to learn in a society that essentially prepares 
them to be wives and mothers. Among the kuchi where women appear to have more social equality to 
men it is interesting to note that the girls were almost exactly as ‘mine smart’ as the boys. As with the 
table 1 showing the results of the questionnaire for adults and children, in this table we can see that the 
kuchi children (of whom 25% claimed to have had some mine awareness at some point) scored better 
results than communities that had received no mine awareness.  
 
Although all children scored relatively low levels on the more complex questions (..concerning 
recognition of minefields, recognising mine marking and safe behaviour in and around unknown areas 
and/or minefields) those children with no mine awareness scored a very low level on these questions, 
with girls in this category only answering 21% of the questions correctly. It should be added that in the 
areas where CBMAP does not operate, of  264 adult and children questioned (in 41 districts) a 
surprising 67% said they considered their village to have a direct problem of mines and UXO.7  
 
 
Findings 1.2.2:    Gender separation  
 
⇒ A very small percentage of women receive mine awareness through CBMAP. Although there are 
low levels of accidents among women they should have access to mine awareness education. 
Islamic culture and the particular interpretation by the Taleban regime currently restricts this. 
 
⇒ A greater number of girls have access to mine awareness but it is still far less that the number of 
boys. CBMAP can take advantage of the access to pre-pubescent girls and offer mine awareness 
training to this group where possible. 
                                                          
7
 This could raise important questions for CBMAP and will be dealt with in sections concerning 
targeting and selection of villages.(see section 2.2) 
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⇒ Village boys are generally about 10% more ‘mine smart’ than girls (according to the questionnaire 
results) whether they have received mine awareness training or not. Kuchi girls and boys were 
found to be about equal in terms of 'mine smart' knowledge. 
 
⇒ In villages where CBMAP operates girls scored well on questions concerning touching and contact 
with mine/UXO but weak on the more practical situational questions. 
 
 
1.3 Impact of training on behavioural change. 
 
If the CBMAP seeks to influence behavioural change it implies that Afghans conduct certain unsafe 
practices which cause injury and death to themselves and their livestock and that if they change their 
behaviour in various respects they can live with greater safety in a mined / UXO environments. 
Discussions with villagers and Kuchie, and victim data collected in Afghanistan, and in other countries 
strongly supports this premise.  
 
Children playing with mines and UXO8, men tampering with items to extract metal or explosive, people 
not recognising minefield marking signs (man-made or natural), entering unknown but suspect areas, 
travelling off-road etc. are all typical examples of activities that cause death and injury and which are in 
most case avoidable. In addition to this the failure to recognise mines, UXO or booby traps through 
ignorance also leads to subsequent activities that are dangerous. The 8 essential mine awareness 
messages of the CBMAP, with the illustration of shapes and sizes of the most common mines and UXO 
(models and flyers) is designed to address people’s lack of awareness and their practice of risky 
behaviour. 
 
Many Afghan men spent the 1980s fighting as Mujahedeen and are very familiar with UXO and mines. 
Also in many mine/UXO affected areas the population have seen the devastating effects of abandoned 
weapons at first hand leading to some critics of mine awareness to claim that mine awareness is 
‘preaching to the converted’ and therefore unnecessary. However, the reality is that in many cases the 
exact opposite is true. Repeatedly villagers admit that only by listening to the messages of mine 
awareness and hearing the stories of mine victims (part of CBMAP’s presentation) they have come to 
realise just how dangerous and certain risk-taking activities are. This was stated by villagers in almost 
all of the case studies and mine committees (MCs) interviewed during this evaluation.   
 
The difference between an intellectual knowledge of a fact and actual changes in behaviour is a 
profound difference and one which directly concerns the objectives of mine awareness education. 
People rarely absorb and/or act on new information on first hearing, and professional educators and 
communication specialists know that repetition, or reiteration, is vital. It is astonishing that many mine 
awareness approaches in Afghanistan as well as in other countries continue to promote mine 
awareness through one-off  direct trainings, based on the optimistic idea that people will both learn and 
understand new information, as well as change their risky behaviour, based on a single presentation9. 
The CBMAP has developed a system of mine awareness that is first based on direct training 
(through the visits of Nomaindas) and then reiterated with regular refresher training (through a 
community based mine committee). 10 
 
                                                          
8
 This activity is the single-most significant cause of death and injury in HI’s project areas and is 
discussed later in this report. 
9 Possibly for mine /UXO recognition and emergency warning messages a single presentation is useful, 
but for attitudinal and behavioural changes it cannot be adequate. 
10
 The Mine Action Plan for Afghanistan are now (after a decade of direct training) promoting a mine 
awareness approach (using village volunteers/representatives) identical to  CBMAP which HI has used 
since 1996. 
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Assessing the impact of direct and indirect training regarding behavioural change among a wide range 
of villagers is complex. Any assessment of behavioural change is limited by the tools it must use as a 
substitute to direct observation of villagers activities. There are three ways to consider the issue: 
 From the statistical evidence of the changes in the number of injuries and deaths caused over 
time in the CBMAP area that are caused by risk-taking behaviour ( mainly playing, handling, 
tampering of mines/UXO but also other activities..) See section 1.4 below. 
 From the group interviews / case studies and feedback from MC in the villages about the 
behaviour of their communities.. 
 From the answers of villagers collected through the questionnaires.   
 
Although all those interviewed for the study were questioned on the matter it is clear that few people will 
admit that they have not changed their behaviour having been trained in mine awareness. Nevertheless 
the findings of these questions were interesting: 
 
 In villages across 41 districts where the CBMAP operates, 88% (of 210 adults interviewed) claimed 
that their behaviour had changed due to mine awareness training. 
 In the same areas, 75% of adult kuchis (75 interviewed ) said that mine awareness changes 
behaviour, while of 144 kuchi children interviewed only 54% said mine awareness changed their 
behaviour.. 
 All sixty mine committees interviewed (100%) claimed that behaviour had changed in their villages 
as a result of mine awareness training. They gave as evidence of this that people would no longer 
touch unknown objects any more, that tampering and playing with mines/UXO had ended, that 
villagers would not enter unknown or marked areas.  
 Perhaps the most common evidence of change given by the MCs was the prevalence of reporting 
UXO and mines to the MC. While this is a commendable development this evaluation notes that as 
the villagers had neither mines representative in the village nor forms before CBMAP(i.e. no means 
of reporting ammunition ), we therefore have no control mechanism to measure whether it is the 
impact of mine awareness that has caused this ‘change of behaviour’. 
 
 
Findings of 1.3: Impact of training on behavioural change 
 
 The evidence from the  210 adult villagers and 76 adult kuchi interviews indicates that people 
themselves regard mine awareness as having changed their behaviour in relation to mines/UXO. 
They value mine awareness and want regular refresher indirect training as they see it as being 
linked to safer behaviour around mines/UXO. 
 
 The Mine Committees questioned for this evaluation (60 in 5 provinces) all claim that their 
communities have changed their behaviour towards mine/UXO to some degree. They list  particular 
changes of activities as evidence of this. If their claims are accurate this is a positive indicator that 
mine awareness is having an impact in this regard. 
 
 The statistical data in one province (Helmand) strongly indicates a big reduction in injuries and 
deaths between 1996-2000. Within this data the number of child-victims due to playing and 
tampering also greatly reduced as a proportion of the total. This could indicate that CBMA has been 
successful at some level, but unfortunately data from other provinces that have also been receiving 
CBMA for some years do not indicate similar trends. The data is too weak to draw reliable 
conclusions.  
 
 That the successful development of large amounts of ammunitions reports from villagers through 
the MCs cannot be used as a indication of behavioural change even though there is strong 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that people no longer touch items and make and effort to report 
them to the MC as a result of the presence and trainings of the MCs. This is a positive indicator of 
safer practices resulting from the project. 
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 That the measurement of behavioural change continues to be a challenge to those implementing 
and evaluating mine awareness where no reliable baseline victim data or behavioural analysis 




1.4 Statistical correlations between incident frequency and project activities. 
 
In this section the critical issue of victim data collection and its management needs to be discussed 
before examining statistical correlations: 
 
1.4.1 Poor data: 
 
The statistical data on mine/UXO victims in Afghanistan is weak and has been severely neglected. It is 
not systematic or regular , it has been collected sporadically by different agencies over the years, has 
been poorly processed, if at all, by MAPA as the central data-collating agency. Only recently have the 
various agencies even agreed to use the same format for information collecting.  
 
The 3 agencies collecting mine incident data are HI, ICRC and MCPA (Mine Clearance Planning 
Agency). MCPA has a poor data base with very  little information collected by its own survey and 
clearance teams. These teams are busy with other work and not dedicated to collection of data and also 
leave an area once their task is complete. Clearly this is highly inadequate for a systematic process.  
 
ICRC have collected data for  3 years through hospitals and clinics and numerous health centres. They 
now have a dedicated team of staff for data collection but their data is limited entirely to areas that have 
health centres and the victims that actually use the facilities. The dead or those with minor injuries are 
not represented therefore and neither can they cover the whole country. However the evidence 
suggests that ICRC's collection from its own centres may be very inadequate. An example of the 
discrepancies between HI and ICRC data can be seen in the following table; 
 
Table No 4 Comparison of victim data for selected provinces HI/ICRC for the same years: 
 
 Handicap ICRC Handicap  ICRC Handicap ICRC 
 Kandahar Kandahar Helmand Helmand Zabul Zabul 
1998 119 6* 41 4 26 2 
1999 45 32 35 5 19 4 
2000 40 19 3 10 24 5 
Totals 204 57 99 19 69 11 
*This figure from the ICRC is particularly worrying: In October 1998 a mine detonated under a wedding 
bus. Of the 79 casualties at least 35 of the injured were treated at ICRC in Kandahar but are unreported 
in ICRC’s own interview data. 
 
HI’s victim data is, in theory, the most  systematic collection base for the provinces in which it works. 
Using the 1150 community based MCs created in 41 districts (5 provinces) it  collects information on a 
monthly basis through these permanent village volunteers. A system that could be comprehensive and 
sustainable. The limitations are that HI does not have mine committees in all villages and have 
expanded to new provinces at different times and therefore for some provinces ( e.g. Ghazni and Farah) 
their coverage is currently low (but continually expanding). This imbalance can be seen in the tables 
No;5 below. Despite claiming to be committed to data gathering, changes in CBMAP management and 
interagency disagreements over forms to be used has resulted in stops and starts in the collection of 
data. Almost no data was collected in 2000. Additionally HI have approximately 4000 complete forms of 
historical data concerning past accidents (prior to 1996) that have not been processed and remain in 
files. It  appears that the importance of collecting victim data is not always recognised by the Field 
Officers and Supervisors of the project and there is little understanding in HI Afghanistan to the potential 
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use of  mine victim data as a strong planning tool for mine action in general. This is somewhat 
surprising as HIB is very involved with the nation-wide victim database in Cambodia and have also 
developed a national proposal for creating an Afghan national data-collection structure since early 
2000.11 
 
MAPA is the central agency that is responsible for collating any mine incident data received from the 3 
agencies mentioned as well as any other source. MAPA freely admits that victim data is handled poorly, 
but they are planning to improve their system  in the future.  
 
Findings for 1.4.1  Poor Data 
 
 What this means is that MAPA (and its implementing partners including HI) have not realised, and 
therefore have not set as a priority over the last 12 years of operations, the considerable power of 
victim data as a planning tool to direct humanitarian mine action intervention. Neither have they or 
other mine action agencies recognised the critical need to establish a baseline data in terms of 
victim data in order monitor progress. The central aim of humanitarian mine action is, presumably, 
the relief of the threat of mines for the population and not simply the clearance of land. 
 
 From a national point of view it is clear that the collection of reliable data is in a very poor state and 
the current dependency on national data from the ICRC is seriously flawed. Any quotations of 
changes in injury/death  levels in recent years in Afghanistan must therefore be resisted as there is 
no method of substantiation. People are talking about a significant drop in casualty rates but there 
is no reliable data to support this at the national level. A rigorous system needs to be put in place 
as soon as possible along the lines of the HI proposal of 2000. Further discussion of this is beyond 
the scope of this evaluation. 
 
 
1.4.2   Constraints to finding correlations: 
 
There are too many other factors that influence accident levels to isolate any particular mine action 
intervention as being the key reason for decreases. In a similar assessment conducted in Cambodia in 
2000 it was found that despite high concentrations of mine clearance, mine marking and mine 
awareness interventions in some affected areas there were no correlations between accident rates and 
mine action operations.12 This is a hard fact to swallow for those active in mine action as well as the 
donors who would like to see a direct correlation between their investment and a decrease in mine/UXO 
accidents.  
 
An analysis of Handicap’s data from 4 provinces is shown below. Special focus has been given to data 
concerning handling of mines and UXO as this is one type of behaviour / activity that mine awareness 
particularly seeks to change 
 
                                                          
11
 Afghanistan Mine Victim Information System (AMVIS) project proposal, as yet un-funded. 
12
 External Evaluation of Unicef-Supported Activitie to Prevent Mine Incidents (Horwood/Crossland 
July 2000) 
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Number of victims 
playing/tampering with 
mine/UXO 
% age of 
total 
Number of these 
under 17 yrs old 
% age of 
playing/tamperin





96 62 64% 49 79%  
1997 
 
71 50 70% 38 76%  
1998 
 
41 17 41% 9 53%  
1999 
 
35 13 37% 6 46%  
2000 
 








Number of victims 
playing/tampering with 
mine/UXO 
% age of 
total 
Number of these 
under 17 yrs old 
% age of 
playing/tamperin





47 10 21% 7 70%  
1998 
 
119* 12 10% 5 55%  
1999 
 
45 25 56% 17 68%  
2000 
 
40 6 15% 3 50%  
*one accident alone in Oct 1998 accounted for 79 of this figure . Without this accident the tampering 







Number of victims 
playing/tampering with 
mine/UXO 
% age of 
total 
Number of these 
under 17 yrs old 
% age of 
playing/tamperin





26 19 73% 9 47%  
1999 
 
19 7 37% 3 43%  
2000 
 








Number of victims 
playing/tampering with 
mine/UXO 
% age of 
total 
Number of these 
under 17 yrs old 
% age of 
playing/tamperin





33 12 36% 11 92%  
 
The ambiguity of the data: 
The above analysis show a very high percentage of children (67% of all handling victims) involved in 
deliberately touching mines and subsequently dying or being injured. These findings are significant and  
strongly justify the ‘Don’t Touch’ message of mine awareness. However, the actual number of children 
injured or killed by tampering playing has fallen from 49 children in Helmand alone in 1996, to 29 
children in 4 provinces in the year 2000 (with only 2 children in Helmand in 2000).  
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Interestingly the general trend  continues when we look at the data from the first  3 months  of 2001 
from all 5 provinces: 45% of the 38 victims reported were injured or killed by handling/playing with 
weapons. Of these 64 % were 17 yrs old or less.  
 
Helmand  statistics indicate a major drop in accident levels from mine and UXO from 96 reported victims 
in ’96 to a low 3 in 2000 but this trend not seen in other provinces according to the CBMAP data. 
Interestingly Kandahar has not seen a major change in victim levels since 1997 , however  there has 
been considerable mine awareness and clearance and mine marking in Kandahar in the last 5 years. 
The problem with this sort of data is that some parts  could be used as an indication of successful mine 
action intervention (where HI’s contribution can be assumed to have made an impact), but other 




Findings of 1.4.2  Constraints to finding correlations 
 
 Data collection of mine and UXO victims in Afghanistan is poor and has been neglected for may 
years. The low commitment to data collection is indicative of a lack of awareness of how important 
this data is to prioritising and planning mine action intervention as well a providing a basis for 
programme evaluation. 
 
 HI have created the basis for a good data-collecting network in selected provinces but have not 
processed the information consistently and have not prioritised this aspect of their work among their 
staff. Nevertheless victim data has been reported by HI every month in their reports and submitted 
to MAPA, despite MAPA’s repeated failure to manage and process this information in their own 
reports or publications.13 
 
 A correlation between CBMAP and changes in victim data can not be made. The available data is 
ambiguous and because it lacks consistency no conclusions can be made. There is no statistical 
evidence that accidents reduce where CBMAP operates. This does not, however mean that it is not 
happening, just we can not show it statistically. If data is collected in areas where CBMAP do not 
operate (and which are mine/UXO affected) it may be possible to illustrate, in future years, that the 
impact of CBMAP reduces accidents. At this stage it is impossible. 
 
 Even where reliable data-bases of victims exist (only Cambodia at present14) there is no 
substantiated evidence that mine awareness or any activity of mine action directly leads to mine 
accident reductions. In a post-conflict and rehabilitation situation there are simply too many other 
factors that account for these changes and mine action activities can rarely be isolated as the main 
causal factor of change.  
 
 
1.5 Capacity and motivation assessment of direct and indirect mine awareness 
trainers. 
 
1.5.1 Nomaindas (direct training) 
 
Nomaindas are direct  employees of CBMAP. There are currently 38 Nomaindas working in the 41 
districts of the five provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Farah and Ghazni. They are directly 
monitored by provincial supervisors (2 per province) and indirectly managed from each provincial office 
by Field Officers (4 to cover the 5 provinces).. They are recruited in the districts where CBMAP decided 
                                                          
13
 When questioned on this, MAPA claimed  that their regional offices did respond to victim data when 
available by prioritising high risk areas for mine action intervention… 
14 Also Kosovo but under very unique circumstances 
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to work and take responsibility for their own district . Nomaindas are tasked to conduct direct training in 
mine affected villages in their designated district. There medium term aim is to give direct training at 
least once to all villagers as well as kuchi and IDPs in their districts. In addition to this to create a 
sustainable basis for mine awareness in the communities they have to recruit, create, train, support and 
monitor volunteers mine committees where ever they can. In reality this means at least one per village 
although some villages have more. Furthermore they are required to regularly collect information from 
the MCs, fill in forms and return these to the supervisors and through the HI system to the Kandahar co-




The capacity  of the Nomaindas appears to be considerable, and their role in the successful 
implementation of CBMAP is central. They are given a high level of independence but have 
considerable demands placed upon them. They are expected to perform at least 2 direct trainings each 
day as well as  compile various reports (i.e. 3 tasks per day).  On average the Nomaindas in the 3 
provinces of Kandahar, Zabul and Helmand supervise between 50-60  mine committees each. Some 
Nomaindas have created up to 110 MC. The new Nomaindas in Ghazni and Farah are still creating 
MCs. The current co-ordinator of the programme suggests that 65 should be the maximum number of 
MCs under any Nomainda. 
 
Since 1996 the Nomaindas have trained approximately 545,000 villagers and Kuchi in mine awareness 
through their direct, one-off training approach. In addition they have created, trained and supported 
1150 functioning MCs. Every month these totals are increasing and of course with the people the MCs 
themselves train, it means that this pyramid of training provides mine awareness to a large proportion of 
the rural population in these provinces.  
 
All Nomaindas are literate and extremely familiar with the core mine awareness messages and the HI 
curriculum. They use participatory methods in their trainings and are all equipped with mine models. 
They sometimes use victims’ stories and tape recordings of the BBC drama ‘New Home, New Life’ in 
their training. The presentations seen during the evaluation followed a format, covered all the issues 
and appeared to capture the attention of those listening for the duration of the training. The training of 
Nomaindas is centralised and curriculum-based which results in a standardised approach and minimal 
deviation. 
 
The Nomaindas are also responsible for the collection of village based data from the MCs on a monthly 
basis. This includes victim data, ammunitions reports and more recently minefield reports, apart from 
the normal reporting of MCs training details. To date the Nomaindas and MCs have generated 2653 
ammunition reports which are sent to the regional MAPA office in Kandahar so that EOD teams of 
another NGO  (MCPA) can respond to these village requests for clearance. They have also collected 
over 4000 ‘historical’ mine victim data forms while regularly submitting accident information (current total 




Nomaindas are paid staff and presumable their key motivation is to maintain their position in HI at 
difficult economic period for most rural Afghans. This evaluation was not able to judge whether religious 
or humanitarian (or other) motivation led Nomaindas to work for HI.  Nevertheless they are not highly 
paid and they have many demands placed on them. This evaluation was very impressed with the high 
output of CBMAP considering the harsh weather condition and distances covered by the Nomaindas 
and the various responsibilities placed upon them. Their role and dedication is central to the whole 
CBMAP structure, which appears to be very productive in terms of collecting data, creating MCs and 
continue direct training. 
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1.5.2 Mine committees (indirect training): 
 
The title ‘mine committee’ can be misleading as the MC normally consists of one man. As of March 





The findings of this evaluation indicate that the capacity of the MCs to train (through re-fresher training 
and in some cases direct training) is considerable . According to the CBMAP selection criteria the MC 
has to be a respected member of the community, must live in the community and should be literate and 
entirely appropriate to their section of their community. They are all volunteers and are in no way 
enticed or compelled to be MC by HI or the Nomaindas.  
 
MCs are given 10 hours training by the Nomaindas after the Nomainda has given direct training 
sessions to the villages with the aim of giving most villages a one-time training exposure. The MC is 
then created to continue this training from then on. An MC only starts to function after he is certified by 
the provincial supervisors after passing a test and receiving a small kit consisting of mine models, a 
blackboard, notebooks and in most cases a small radio. The Nomaindas (and sometime supervisors) 
monitor the MCs regularly at least once a month and initially 2 times a month. At least once a month the 
Nomaindas are expected to collect data from the MC under their jurisdiction and this visit provided an 
opportunity for the Nomaindas to encourage and monitor the work of the MC 
 
The evaluation found that  of the 60 MC questioned, on average, they gave training to children in their 
village either on a weekly basis (12%), on a two-weekly basis (35%) or on a monthly (45%) basis. They 
also gave separate training to adults on a weekly basis (12%), on a two-weekly basis (25%) or on a 
monthly basis (57%). As an average they divided their time between children and adults with 68% of 
their time to children, and 32% to adults.   
 
Almost all (95% ) of the MCs interviewed claimed that they were able to reach the whole of the village 
through their trainings. This was not substantiated by the findings of group interviews in the case 
studies. In the case studies, which mostly took place in villages where MCs were active, it was not 
unusual for members of the village to say they had not ever attending trainings (informal or formal) by 
the MCs even when the MC may have been operational for some years. Clearly there are limitations to 
the capacity of the MCs in  this regard. Some villagers are large with various mosques (community 
centres) and despite there being more than one MC in the village they do not make contact with the 
entire community . The informal nature of the MC and his frequent use of a single mosque or madressa 
as the venue for his training means that those outside of that mosque of madrassa will probably not 
have exposure to mine awareness from the MC concerned. The questionnaire results showed that 43% 
of the MCs train informally, 40% do so formally (schools, madrassas and mosques)while 17% use both 
approaches. This reality needs to be considered more seriously by the CBMAP, and closer supervision 
of the larger villages may be necessary by the Nomaindas and provincial supervisors. 
 
The wide (and increasing) network of MCs does enable a large number of people to hear mine 
awareness training on a regular basis. CBMAP has recorded a total of 699,972 people trained by MC 
(including those attending the radio forum organised by MCs with radios) since 1996. In terms of 
volunteer capacity this is a very high number.15 As the programme is consolidated in the province where 
they started earliest  we should expect to see a drop in attendance levels of ‘new’ trainees and a rise in 
the number of refresher trainings for ‘old’ trainees. For this reason it would be wrong in coming years to 
assess the success of the activities of CBMAP by the number of people that attend their trainings. The 
situation is very different for other mine awareness agencies that emphasis the one-off training 
                                                          
15
 It may be added that HI have recorded their attendance figure for training quite conservatively, 
recognising that in many training sessions some people will have already attended previous trainings. 
As of March 2001 they require the MC to record ‘new’ and ‘old’ attendees separately. 
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approach. For them numbers of attendees will remain a central tool to measure their progress, (despite 




The findings from the 60 MCs questioned for the evaluation indicate that they have a strong  religious 
and social (humanitarian) motivation for offering their services as a village volunteer. 98% indicated that 
they would continue to act as the mine committee even if the Nomaindas (i.e. CBMAP) stopped to 
support them or visit them. This is a very positive finding in regard to appropriateness and sustainability 
of the position of MCs in the communities.(more discussion of this can be found in section 2.4 ) 
 
Another indication of the motivation, and sustainability of the MCs is the extremely low level  of 
discontinued MCs. Only 81 of the total number of MCs created since 1996 have stopped working, 
representing only 6% of the total. Considering they work as volunteers this is impressive. 
 
It has been suggested that part of the attraction and motivation of the MCs is that the peace-time fight 
against the scourge of mines/UXO is considered jihad (holy war) and for this reason the recruitment of 
MCs is much easier than recruiting health volunteers, for example. However, all  MCs interviewed were 
asked if they would be willing to collected information on a volunteer basis on other issues (such as 
health, which could assist health NGOs) and the response was 95% positive. Already HI uses its 
extensive network of MCs to collect data on mine victims, minefields and ammunition reports. The 
potential benefits  of such a network could be considerable . This will be discussed later in the report. 
 
1.5.3 Training of IDPs / returnees and nomads (kuchi): 
 
The CBMAP identifies IDPs, returnees and Kuchi as particular target groups in all of the projects’ 5 
provinces and are reported separately from villagers in HI documentation. They are considered more 
vulnerable  to mines and UXO by the mine action community  due to their lifestyles or changes in 
situations. 
 
Although in villages mine committees may train known ‘newcomers’ or returnees (often Afghan villagers 
returning from years in Pakistan or Iran) and may also give training to passing kuchies, it is mainly the 
task of the Nomaindas to meet these needs. Nomaindas are required to give training to identified 
groups of IDPs and to kuchi groups as they arrive and camp in their areas of jurisdiction. On occasions 
outside agencies with contact HI directly or through the regional mine action centre (RMAC) to request 
mine awareness training in particular IDP camps. IDP from the drought (and some continued violence in 
the north) can be found in western and southern Afghanistan. 16 
 
CBMAP have been reporting their direct training of IDPs since early  2000. Between early 2000 and 
April 2001 in Farah, Kandahar and Helmand , approximately  2596  IDPs have been given direct training 
in mine awareness. As it is not clear how many IDPs there are in total in these specific area it is hard to 
evaluate the coverage of Handicaps contribution in this area. This total represents only 1.2% of 
CBMAP’s overall training (direct only) during the same period. According to HI data , as of March 2001, 
8 mine committees had been created among IDPs.  
 
HI has only recently started documenting the training given to ‘returnees’. Since September 2000 they 
have given training to 559 persons in this category. 
 
Nomaindas also give direct training to the kuchi. The questionnaire results indicated that many of the 
MC also give informal training to kuchi but this is not recorded separately. It is not clear if the number of 
kuchi the MCs train are included in the MC figures. 41% of all the Nomaindas trainees are kuchi, over 
221,000 have been trained since 1996. This figure represents  only 18% of the total number of people 
                                                          
16
 HI are currently in discussions with RMAC in Heart and Kandahar concerning the training of IDP 
camp volunteers there. 
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trained by CBMAP during the last 5 years. It is hard to estimate the current number of kuchi in 
Afghanistan. A working estimate from the United Nations suggests there are approximately 800,000.  
HI assume that due to the difficulty of tracking different kuchi groups many kuchi may have received 
double or triple training over recent years as they move from district to district and have contact with 
different Nomaindas. There are only 7 MCs in kuchi groups. This situation needs to be re-considered by 
HI as the volunteers representative system has a range of benefits to the people as well as HI and the 
lack of MCs among the kuchi is a missed opportunity on both sides17. Apart from this the kuchi are 
extremely vulnerable to mines and UXO during their travels and HI needs to find a way to maximise 
mine awareness in their communities. 
 
1.5.4 Current and future capacity: 
 
Handicap’s CBMA structure take time and resources to set up , but once it is functioning it has a 
immense capacity to deliver mine awareness to an ever increasing number of affected communities. 
Due to ‘economies of scale’ and the capacity of the Nomaindas to create and monitor large numbers of 
mine committees, the CBMAP can continue to offer its benefits to an increasing number of people at a 
decreasing cost per capita ( i.e. person trained). 
 
An example of the productivity of the programme as it stands at the moment is to take an extract from 
the latest quarterly report (Jan-March 2001)  
• 104,607 people were trained in mine awareness (direct and indirect) 
• The Nomaindas visited a total of 321 new villages in the 5 provinces. 
• 770 radio forums were held by the mine committees. 
• 44 new mine committees were recruited, trained and created during this quarter.  
• 46 mine victim casualty reports were completed and submitted from the project areas. 
• 363 new ammunition reports were completed and submitted by mine committees . 
 
The CBMAP operates with the same team of 38 Nomaindas, 10 supervisors and 4 Field Officers but 
due to the expanding number of volunteer mine committees their productivity increases and 
considerable ‘economies of scale’ are possible.  
 
Limitations to growth & measurement of growth (progress indicators): 
 
It is important to understand that despite the high ‘productivity’ evident in the CBMAP it would be a 
mistake to expect this to continue and a mistake to judge the success of the programme by ‘production 
figure’ such as those listed above.   
 
As HI continues to expand into new areas (such as in Farah and now Ghazni) the numbers will continue 
to increase in terms of new MCs, new trainees, radio forums etc. However, there is a limitation to this 
growth. When Nomaindas have given direct training to everyone in their project  areas and when they 
have created all the required MCs they will need to focus more on support and monitoring; Their new 
training figures will drop dramatically. Equally as the MC train all their villagers in mine awareness and 
then continue with refresher training and reiteration HI cannot record these trainings in the same way 
that they currently record ‘new’ training. Also with ammunition reports. There will be a finite limit to how 
many reports a village will generate just as there is with minefields, and it should be expected that after 
some time less and less ammunition report will be submitted. (This will be a positive sign in an area 
where submission of reports has been active as will indicate that most UXO have been identified and 
will soon be demolished, thereby making the villages UXO –free  for ever.) 
 
The overall ‘production’ figures will therefore fall as the programme consolidates its position . Clearly 
victim data reporting will continue and training report from the village mine committees will continue but 
                                                          
17
 Reliable kuchi victim data, ammunitions reports and a sustainable mine awareness network among 
this vulnerable group are all missed by just offering direct training to kuchi and not developing a 
volunteer representative option. 
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the role of the HI staff will become one of maintaining and supporting the large number of village 
volunteers. HI staff both in Afghanistan and HQ , MAPA authorities as well as donors need to be aware 
of this so that expectations of the project are realistic. Reduced output figures will by no means indicate 
a demise in the effectiveness of the project. On the contrary it could indicate a consolidation and 
increased level of effectiveness among the affected populations. 
 
Concerning measurement of progress, over time, the CBMAP should focus more on changes of 
behaviour and quality of ‘mine smart’ knowledge in all target areas. In mine awareness the quality of 
training and the effective use of the training by the villagers is as important as the quantity measured in 
terms of coverage and trainees. The former is far harder to measure and will present HI staff with a 
significant challenge. This external evaluation has gone some way to indicate the quality of the 
programme in different areas  but this function needs to be internalised in CBMAP and become part of 
their own monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.  
 
The case studies in particular revealed gaps and missed opportunities in some of the target villages, 
that the statistics and high ‘production’ figures can easily hide. The case studies and some results of the 
questionnaires raise some central questions that need to asked of the programme managers and co-
ordinators. See section 1.8 for more details. 
 
Findings for all 1.5:  Capacity and motivation assessment of direct and indirect mine awareness 
trainers. 
⇒ The Nomainda –based system is highly effective at developing a pyramidal structure with fast 
expansion capacity for information gathering as well as mine awareness dissemination. 
⇒ Nomaindas perform a central task in the CBMAP under difficult conditions. Their determination and 
continuity should be commended. 
⇒ The selection and recruitment of MCs appears to be appropriate and the concept of using only 
village volunteers is a central aspect of HI's concept in CBMAP. 
⇒ The ability of MCs to reach all members of their community must not be exaggerated. It is clear this 
is not the case and remedial attention is required by HI to address this deficiency. 
⇒ The motivation of MCs is primarily religious and humanitarian. Afghanistan may be a unique 
context in which a system of this nature can flourish. Possibly not replicable in other countries. 
⇒ The effectiveness of this 'information transfer system' could be harnesses for other humanitarian 
concerns outside of mines. 
⇒ His failure to develop a different structure to address the issue of meeting the needs of the Kuchi 
represents a lost opportunity and should be corrected . 
⇒ The potential for expansion of the HI system is considerable. 
⇒ HI's role in their current 5 provinces will change over time as they consolidate the programme: 
'prodution' figures will cease to be meaningful as a measure of the programmes' success and 
dynamism. 
⇒ Measure of the success of the programme needs to focus more on change of behaviour, increase 
in mine smart knowledge and clear reduction in numbers of preventable accidents.  
 
1.6 Community perceptions and expectations of mine awareness interventions. 
 
Both in the case studies interviews and through the questionnaires villagers expressed a high level 
interest and importance to mine awareness training. They were positive about the need and relevance 
of mine awareness and strongly wished it to be continued . Almost none of those questioned expressed 
indifference or tiredness concerning the trainings and a high percentage wanted the training to be 
continued regularly in their villages.  
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Statistically the results of the questionnaires were as follows: 
 
In randomly selected villages evenly spread across the 38 districts where CBMAP operates, 629 people 
were asked whether they thought their community needed to receive mine awareness training: 97% of 
210 adults interviewed responded positively. 95% of 419 children interviewed responded positively. 
Of these same interviewees only 5% of the adults and 5% of the children claimed they were tired of  
hearing the mine awareness message. Concerning repetition (or reiteration), 96% of the adults and 95% 
of the children felt mine awareness should be given repeatedly and not in one teaching lesson. 
94% adults (of 210 interviewed) confirmed in a final question that mine awareness continued to be good 
for their community.  
 
Sixty mine committees were interviewed. Of these 96% confirmed that their villages wanted more mine 
awareness training. Although 33% of the MCs said there were some people in their community who 
were resistant to the mine awareness message they appear to represent a small minority in each village 
 
Of   219 randomly selected  kuchi adults and children questioned (in 38 different districts of the five 
provinces) 95% responded that they felt mine awareness was necessary in their communities. Of these 
just over half (58%) had had a visit and one-time training from a HI Nomainda or visiting MC at some 
point. Despite the fact that CBMAP has almost no MCs in kuchi communities 73% of the 60 MCs 
interviewed claimed that they visited kuchi communities from time to time. They confirmed that every 
kuchi community that they visited was enthusiastic to receive mine awareness training. 
 
This evaluation was surprised to find such a high level of interest and enthusiasm for mine awareness in 
communities interviewed. In some cases the Nomaindas and MC have been operating for over 4 years 
and it would not have been surprising for many to be somewhat indifferent to mine awareness training 
and its continuation. In fact, for those communities where there have been high casualty levels and little 
mine clearance or mine marking intervention it would not have been surprising to encounter resentment 
towards mine awareness which is at best a preventative ‘public safety’ message and not a cure to the 
problem. Instead the overwhelming attitude was one of support and recognising the relevance. HI 
should take some credit that they have established a methodology and approach that is very acceptable 
to the communities and which is taken seriously by the people. The semi-structured interviews (case 
studies) with groups of villagers entirely corroborates the findings on these issues from the results of the 
questionnaires. 
 
Findings of 1.6 Community perceptions and expectations of mine awareness 
interventions. 
 
⇒ The perception of the vast majority of the communities where CBMAP operates is highly supportive 
of the existence and continuation of mine awareness training. HI have clearly developed a 
methodology and approach which is both acceptable and perceived as relevant to communities. 
 
⇒ Communities indicate a strong desire for mine awareness to continue and with frequency. This 
suggests that there is a strong basis for the sustainability of the programme. 
 
⇒ That the kuchis have a high interest in receiving more mine awareness and due to their uniquely 
vulnerable status in Afghanistan in relation to mines HI should put more emphasis into providing 
kuchis with systematic mine awareness training in stead of the ad hoc visits by Nomaindas and 
MCs. 
 
1.7 HI/CBMAP as part of the overall Mine Acton Programme for Afghanistan(MAPA) 
 
Although not part of the TOR for this evaluation, it is felt that CBMAP needs to be seen in the context of 
the overall Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan co-ordinated by UNOCHA (Islamabad) and through 
its 4 regional offices (a 5th to be created shortly in the north) 
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Handicap has always voluntarily placed itself under the co-ordination of UNOCHA/ MAPA, although it 
obtains all of its programme funding independently. This is part of HIs overall policy in mine action to 
combine efforts, avoid duplication, share expertise and information with the wider mine action 
community. The largest  NGO conducting mine awareness within MAPA is OMAR, and other agencies 
active in mine awareness include Save The Children-US, The Afghan Red Crescent Society, the BBC-
Afghan Education Programme, AMAA (Afghan Mine Awareness Agency) and ARI (Ansar Releif 
Institute). Halo Trust and other clearance NGOs perform some mine awareness where they work but 
not in a systematic of dedicated manner. 
 
HI participates in national co-ordination meetings (quarterly) a well as monthly meetings held in 
Kandahar by the Southern Regional Mine Action Centre. It submits progress reports to RMAC every 
months as well as accident data and ammunitions reports collected by Nomaidas and mine committees. 
Since early 2001 the CBMAP network is also staring to submit minefield information from villages 
concerning minefields identified by villagers which are not included in the data base of MCPA- the 
survey and marking agency within MAPA. The capacity of the CBMAP network to generate village-
based information (victim data, new minefields, ammunition reports) is an important added value in 
addition to the mine awareness dissemination it performs.  
 
In terms of mine awareness support and coordination HI receives little operational or methodological 
benefit from being part of MAPA. Occasionally MAPA has assisted HI by advising another agency to 
curtail duplication of mine awareness or practises that undermine the CBMAP approach in their areas.18 
However the HI rural community based approach remains a progressive and innovative differs from 
other mine awareness agencies in Afghanistan., although some are currently moving towards a 
volunteer based system.19. It may be noted that in a recent planning document from the Plans and 
Operations Manager of MAPA (April 2001) almost all the activities and plans  that are suggested for 
mine awareness agencies are based on the exact approach of CBMAP.  
 
MAPA appear to be pleased with HI’s participation in data collection and mine awareness and are also 
keen to see them develop and field the proposed EOD teams. In terms of international profile and 
credibility with donors, MAPA’s accreditation of HI and the CBMAP and its participation in MAPA is a 
benefit to HI. This evaluation strongly recommends the continuation of HI in MAPA and comments that 
HI and its considerable success with CBMAP probably has a relatively low profile in Kabul and 
Islamabad due to lack of representation and presence in those centres. 
 
Victim Data and a national data collection proposal: 
 
Issues concerning victim data collection in HI as well as nationally are discussed in detail in section 1.4. 
As mentioned the national data generally is poor and unreliable, coming as it does from irregular and  
incomplete sources. Furthermore MAPA management of data received from the 3 main agencies that 
report to them has been very unsatisfactory. HI does have more systematic and regular network for 
collecting information and is in a strong position to provide  reliable information on the 5 provinces in 
which it works. This  system will only increase and improve as their coverage in provinces increases 
(especially in Farah and Ghazni where they are still creating MCs). This evaluation suspects that apart 
from some deficiencies already mentioned in section 1.4, the HI collection network probably misses a 
considerable number of deaths and injuries sustained by kuchis. This evaluation will suggest 
recommendations to remedy this. 
 
                                                          
18
 During 1999 and 2000 there were cases where OMAR were conducting mine awareness in the same 
villagers where HI had MCs and were in addition recruiting village representatives who received pay 
for the first 3 months and then were required to become voluntary. Not surprisingly  most stopped 
working after 3 months. OMAR abandoned this approach. 
19
 Following a visit to the HI programme, in 1997  SCF-US began an effective volunteer system in 
Kabul. 
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In early 2000 HI , following discussions with ICRC, WHO and MAPA put together a proposal to develop 
a national system for mine victim information – AMVIS- Afghanistan Mine Victim Information System. As 
of May 2001 no progress has been made to establish funding for this project . This evaluation considers 
the development of a national data system for the accurate recording of mine and UXO victims to be 
vital. That MAPA has operated for 12 years without any real idea of the number and circumstance of 
victims is remarkable. Such data is not only vital to monitor the rise or fall of incidents in specific areas, 
act as a baseline against which progress can be monitored, but is a powerful planning and prioritisation 
tool for mine clearance, mine awareness and victim support services. HI have experience in Cambodia 
where they run (with the Cambodian Red Cross) a national victim data system  which provide monthly 
reports with detailed analysis of changes and commune level location of accidents. This information is 
used by the mine action community within Cambodia and outside. This evaluation does not promote any 
particular agency to be the lead agency in a similar initiative in Afghanistan, but it does recommend 
strongly that a system is established in Afghanistan without delay. Full support should be given to the 
current proposal . 
 
Ammunition Reports and new EOD initiatives: 
 
The CBMAP network is also very effective in collecting information concerning ‘stray mines’ and UXO in 
rural areas. Mine committees and Nomaindas are specially trained to complete forms that are then 
passed onto RMAC (Kandahar). Since 1996 (up to March 2001) 2,653 ammunition reports have been 
submitted to RMAC. They give this information to MCPA which is the only agency in the southern region 
to have one mobile EOD team available to respond to these reports. A single team has been found to 
be inadequate to meet the needs and HI lose moral and motivation to report when long delays occur 
between the time of reporting and the time when the EOD team arrives to conduct the destruction of the 
item reported. Data collected by HI in their project areas and reinforced by findings of there data from 
other regions indicate that a disproportionately high number of children are being killed and injured by 
tampering and playing with abandoned UXO. 
For some years HI have requested MAPA for permission to set up their own EOD teams to respond to 
the reports generated by  their village volunteers and Nomaindas. Since 2000 MAPA have recognised 
the need for an increase in designated EOD teams operating in different parts of Afghanistan and plans 
have been approved for the establishment a  number of new mobile EOD teams.  ECHO has proposed 
to fund this development. HI will be responsible (with MCAP’s existing team) for the southern region and 
is currently planning the recruitment of staff and equipment for the setting up of 2 EOD teams. These 
two mobile teams will be established by the end of 2001 and immediately work on the backlog of 
ammunition reports that the MCPA team has been unable to address. This evaluation strongly supports 
this development and expansion of HI’s operational profile in Afghanistan. 
 
 
Findings of 1.7: HI/CBMAP as part of the overall Mine Acton Programme for 
Afghanistan(MAPA) 
 
⇒ Strategically and operationally it is important for HI to remain a participating member of MAPA 
despite the fact that the programme has felt few direct benefits in terms of mine awareness 
ideology or shared experience from other mine awareness agencies and MAPA itself. 
 
⇒ That the volunteer network in many hundreds of villages in affected areas gives HI a  high capacity 
for valuable information transfer . This can be seen in the high levels of trainees as well as the 
victim data information and ammunition report which are useful to MAPA. 
 
⇒ That HI’s link through the RMAC with EOD teams in other agencies has enabled ammunition 
reports to be addressed in the past. Due to the high number of requests generated there is a need 
for more EOD teams and that HI’s plan to develop 2 new EOD teams in 2001 is commendable, if 
not overdue. 
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⇒ That despite the disappointing standard of victim data collection and processing nationally, HI is 
establishing a solid basis and is well placed to improve the data collected in its regions 
substantially. That it should continue to submit all victim data to MAPA as it tries to improve its 
management of this data.In this regard HI should vigorously promote the establishment of the 
national data collection plan as laid out in the AMVIS proposal written in 2000. 
 
  
1.8 Towards project progress indicators.  
 
The case studies in particular revealed gaps and missed opportunities in some of the target villages, 
that the statistics and high ‘production’ figures can easily hide. The case studies and some results of the 
questionnaires raise some central questions that need to asked of the programme managers and co-
ordinators. Some key questions that need to become internalised and part of CBMAP regular monitoring 
and evaluation include; 
How is it that there are villagers who have not been trained after 4 years of Nomainda and MC trainings 
in the village? 
How do we reach every household in a village? 
How do we measure the change of behaviour among villagers? 
Why is it that in villages where mine awareness has been trained for years do children still play with 
UXO?/ step on mines? 
Is there a direct link between people becoming ‘mine smart’ through training and subsequent changes in 
risk-taking behaviour? 
As adult men are the most vulnerable group, are we sure the MC are really addressing their needs? 
The kuchi are probably the most vulnerable group but  have no volunteer representative structure; how 
can CBMAP address their needs better? 
How do we measure the quality of the programme and not the quantity of the activities? 
 
2.0 Evaluation of Operations 
 
2.1 Project structure and resources 
 
The project structure is straight forward and uncomplicated: The CBMAP coordinators (one expat /one 
national) co-ordinate the three levels of staff that consist of provincial field officers (4 for 5 provinces), 10 
supervisors (2 per province) and the 38 Nomaindas. This structure is illustrated as annex B. For some 
months the project has been co-ordinated by the national co-ordinator as HI Brussels has been 
recruiting a new expatriate co-ordinator to head the team. This new co-ordinator will arrive in early June 
2001. 
 
Field Officers live at the provincial field offices in Farah city, (Farah), Ghazni city (Ghazni), Grishk 
(Helmand), Qalat (Zabul) and Kandahar city (Kandahar). Each field office has a designated vehicle for 
the programme. All Nomaindas and supervisors have motorbikes which are used extensively in their 
daily work. 
 
Findings of  2.1: Project structure and resources 
 
⇒ This evaluation finds the management structure to be simple and effective, with a low level of paid 
staff able to control a network that benefits 41 districts, thousands of villages and reaches hundreds 
of thousands of people. The Nomaindas and supervisors should be commended for their dedication 
in particularly difficult geographical and climatic conditions, having to traverse vast areas  of the 41 
districts they cover in Southern Afghanistan. 
 
⇒ The current structure has considerable potential for further expansion in terms of reaching more 
communities with mine awareness (creating more MCs) without increasing the number of paid staff.   
The current co-ordinator feels that  the number of MC could double (giving each Nomainda and 
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average of 65 MC each) without increasing the staff number or structure. These ‘economies of 
scale’ are a major benefit of the CBMAP design 
 
2.2 Project coverage and selection mechanisms 
 
The CBMAP is now working in five province. It started in Kandahar in 1996. In late 1997 it expanded to 
Zabul, followed by Helmand in January of 1998. In February 2000 they started in Farah and this 
January 2001 they began recruiting and training Nomaindas in Ghazni. CBMAP is currently covering the 
southern part of Afghanistan as well as Farah in the south-west and Ghazni (which is considered a 
central province.) 
 
The selection of province has not only been based on highest priorities or needs assessments but on 
logistical, administrative and political considerations as well. In addition to this ‘donor politics’ have 
played a part. HI was already based in Kandahar in 1996 having run disability projects for some years. It 
was a high priority province and expanding to other districts in Kandahar was a natural expansion 
following some months of pilot activities in Dand district. Expansion between 1997-2000 into adjacent  
provinces was an instinctive process in terms of logistics and communications, management and 
proximity. HI did have the intention  and donor commitment, to extend into Herat, considered extremely 
high priority, in 2000. The Teleban blocked this and the result was Ghazni becoming the 5th province 
within the CBMAP after consultations with MAPA who favoured Ghazni as opposed to Paktika (HI’s 
original choice) . The various details of donor relations, internal and external politics with the Taleban, 
MAPA and within HI are not important to this report, but illustrate the reality of NGO presence and 
expansion often being a function of different pressures and considerations. 
 
The last expatriate co-ordinator of CBMAP wrote a critical report concerning the lack of sufficient 
justification for HI to chose new provinces without observing more rigorous selection criteria. This 
evaluation finds that in the cut and thrust of ‘donor politics’, geographical, logistical and communications 
constraints, the urgency to respond to a widespread but undocumented need (i.e. no real victim data)   
create a situation where choices are as much pragmatic as they are idealistic. The issue of concern is 
not that of province selection but of village selection within the high-risk districts that are selected by 
CBMAP:The village selection is left up to the Nomaindas. 
 
Of the 64 districts in the 5 provinces CBMAP has recruited Nomaindas to train villagers and create MCs 
in 41 districts. These districts have been selected by CBMAP as most-affected and requiring mine 
awareness intervention. The districts themselves are selected by using MAPAs minefield survey data 
that illustrate where the most heavily mined areas are. A needs assessment survey is conducted in a 
selection of villages in these districts to see how high the level of need is for mine awareness and the 
level of interest of the population. HI staff also claim they consult NGOs and local authorities a part of 
this process. Once the assessment has been analysed districts are selected, Nomaindas are recruited 
and trained. Then they start to train the local people in their village and in surrounding villages. First by 
foot and then after 3 months of trial period with a motorbike. The normal direct training visits and MC-
creating pattern is of an ever widening ring of villages around the village where the Nomainda lives.  
 
This is a weakness of the CBMAP programme as villages that need mine awareness may be missed 
due to their location, accessibility or distance from the Nomaindas preferred areas of operations. When 
adults in villagers (where CBMAP has not been operational and are not planning to be operational i.e in 
Helmand , Zabul and Kandahar) were asked if they considered their village to be directly at risk from 
landmines, 81% replied positively. This could indicate that the current system of allowing the Nomainda 
themselves to select which villages they work in is flawed and that HI need to review and revise their 
selection process within districts as soon as possible. To some extent HI already recognise this 
weakness and in their newest province (Ghazni) the Field Officer is being tasked to monitor the target 
areas chosen by the Nomaindas carefully and continue needs assessment analysis as an on-going 
activity. 
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In terms of coverage it is very difficult to establish how many villages there are in the project provinces/ 
districts. The Gazette, MCPA and Programme Management Information System (UN-PROMIS) 
according to HI’s findings are grossly underestimating the number of actual villages in each district. HI is 
currently requesting the project field staff to count the number of villages in the areas along with 
numbers of households in each village, the village names and the number of mosques. Equally with 




Findings of 2.2: Project coverage and selection mechanisms 
 
⇒ This evaluation realises that this section is inconclusive and sheds little light on the scope of HI’s 
coverage. Nevertheless it is clear that in the 5 provinces there are 38 Nomaindas working in the 
most affected districts. Their duty is to give direct training throughout the district in mine affected 
villages and kuchi camps. To what extent this is occurring cannot be measured at this stage except 
by the considerable numbers of trainees in all locations and the establishment of large numbers of 
MCs (over 1150) and visits made to at least 4,200 villages in the last 6 years. 
 
⇒ As indicated there is a weakness in the selection system concerning villages within districts. HI 
needs to have a more rigorous process of ensuring that other villagers that are not currently 
included in the work of Nomainda and MC are not at risk. The questionnaire result appear to show 
that many people living in such areas consider themselves at risk and in need of mine awareness. 
 
2.3 Staff monitoring and training . 
 
The MCs are monitored and encouraged though a minimum of once a month visits (sometimes more 
frequent) by the Nomainda, occasionally accompanied by the supervisors. During these visits the 
Nomainda helps the MCs to fill in forms and collect the information concerning his training , accident 
data and any munitions reports. Nomainda are also required to make assessments (using prepared 
forms) of the MCs from time to time. When the MC is created he receives approximately 10 hours of 
one to one training from the Nomainda during a maximum period of 6 days. In 2000 HI gave three 
refresher and form-filling training sessions to 50 MCs each time in the 3 provinces of Helmand, 
Kandahar and Zabul. This year they hope to repeat the exercise but including many more of the MCs. 
 
The Nomaindas are monitored by the 2 supervisors for each Province. They compile all the reports 
coming from the villages through the Nomaindas and regularly visit the Nomaindas as they perform 
direct training. The Nomaindas always leave a note on their house door saying where they are so that 
the supervisors and field officer can always locate them. There are no electronic or telephonic forms of 
communication between the provincial office and the Nomaindas and/or MC. Supervisors are also 
required to make assessments (using prepared forms) of the Nomaindas from time to time. 
 
The supervisors and Nomaindas are co-ordinated and managed at the provincial level by the Field 
Officers and all three levels are given training in Kandahar every 3 month by the co-ordinator himself. At 
these training sessions a general internal evaluation is made of the progress made, problems 
encountered and new ideas are discussed. 
 
In the new proposal to cover the period from June 2001 into the future a ‘Training Cell’ has been 
planned which will consist of 2 trainers tasked to monitor and training the supervisors and Nomainda in 
the field. 
 
Findings of 2.3: Staff monitoring and training 
 
⇒ The current structure of monitoring and training appear to be working well and meeting the needs of 
different levels of management. The frequent 3-monthly training for Field Officers, Supervisors and 
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Nomainda is judged to be very positive in terms of keeping a close control of standards, monitoring 
problems as they arise and developing a strong team spirit. 
 
⇒ This evaluation found that more control was needed concerning the understanding  by field staff of 




2.4 Status & function of the Mine Committee 
 
2.4.1 The social origin and function of the MC and its influence upon its motivation, impact 
and credibility. 
 
Between April 1996 and March 2001 (5 years) HI has created 1228 Mine Committees of  which 1150 
are currently active. Some of the MCs have assistants bring the total of currently-supported mine 
awareness volunteers to over 1300 in five provinces. These village volunteers have been created as HI 
has expanded from Kandahar, to Zabul and Helmand and more recently to Farah and Ghazni. In these 
last two provinces new MCs are being created on a regular basis based on the province’s needs 
assessment (conducted by HI prior to entry into the province) and as part of the duties of the local 
Nomaindas. In the provinces where HI has been operating for some years new MCs are created only 
when mine-risk villages that still do not have MCs come to the notice of the Nomaindas and the 
provincial supervisors. 
 
Of the current MCs supported by the programme approximately 35% are local farmers. 38% are either 
mullahs or student mullahs (talebs) and 14% are teachers in the local madrasas or schools while 5% 
are local health workers. The final 8% are tailors, drivers, jobless or shopkeepers. Only 2 of all the MCs 
are headman / leaders of their communities. Nomaindas who are responsible for the creation of new 
MCs are aware that they have to select members of the community that have a good level of respect 
and of course MCs are only created in villages where they community show both an interest and desire 
for mine awareness. Clearly MCs share the same origins as other community members and live within 
the village.20 The social status of the MCs, as illustrated above, indicate that most of the MCs are 
respected community members. Those familiar with Islamic societies will understand the immense 
importance of the mullah, as well as school teachers, in rural communities. 
 
The evaluation found that almost all MC interviewed (sample size of 60) themselves considered that 
they were able to reach all members of their community with mine awareness messages. During the 
case studies it appeared that the MC was always respected, mine awareness training valued and his 
ability to reach all members of the community was normally a function of the physical size of the village 
or the newness of the MC in the community. 
 
Among the Kuchi there are only 5 active MCs . Almost all training of Kuchi (which in terms of trained 
persons accounts for 40% of all direct training) is conducted by Nomaindas who do not come from the 
Kuchi communities. It should be noted that although the lifestyles of settled villagers and Kuchies differ 
considerably their common ethnic origins means a Nomainda can enter a Kuchie encampment and 
enjoy the hospitality and respect of the people during the training period. 21 Nevertheless considering 
that the Kuchi groups are especially vulnerable to mines and UXO this evaluation suggests that greater 
efforts are made to establish volunteer representatives within Kuchi groups. Perhaps a different 
                                                          
20
 During one of the case studies (No: XX) a young hazari  (ethnic group within Afghanistan) man was 
interviewed as the MC for a small community of hazaris within a larger rural community. 
21
 Pastoral nomadism in Afghanistan is highly dynamic in terms of the nomadic life being a choice 
based on economic and climatic opportunity. A nomadic community this decade could switch to a 
settled existence in another decade. However it is also true that many settled, and especially urban 
Afghan group have a pejorative view of the Kuchies.  
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methodology has to be found for them and a different support structure, but currently the HI structure 
favours settled communities although the evidence suggests Kuchies are exposed to higher risk. 
 
All MCs are male. This is a function of the social and cultural realities (which may be seen as 
‘constraints’ ) in Afghanistan. Despite this and the fact that woman have severely limited access to mine 
awareness training the Nomaindas and MC are able train a significant number of  women and girls. This 
is discussed in section 1.2.2 of this report. 
 
Currently HI appears to not be pressurising Nomaindas (and their provincial Field Officers) to create 
new MC in order to meet targets or to impress superiors with ‘output’ levels. There may, however, have 
been some element of this in earlier years when HI was keen to establish its programme with wide 
coverage. Nevertheless the MCs are volunteers who receive no incentives of any kind other than a 
functional training kit and in many cases a small radio (worth less than $4 USA). The evaluation found  
that the primary motivation of the MC was a combination of Islamic faith and duty combined with a 
humanitarian desire to save their fellow villagers from the dangers of mines. HI’s own experience over 
the years indicates that many of the MCs consider that the struggle against mines is still part of the 
jihad, (holy war) and participation is a particular honour for any Muslim.22  
 
Over the last 5 years only 6% of the MCs created have decided to relinquish their role after agreeing to 
acting as volunteers23. This indicates a high degree of stability among the volunteers many of whom 
have been working for at least 2 years and others up to 4 or 5 years as volunteers. The others appear to 
be actively giving their communities training and reporting munitions and other data to the HI 
Nomaindas .If MCs had been created merely to meet quotas or raise statistics we could expect to see a 
high number of defunct or inactive MC. According to HI’s monitoring information and data collection this 
is not the case. Due to the considerable hardship caused by the drought in the last 2 years some MCs 




Findings of 2.4.1  Status & function of the Mine Committee 
 
⇒ The social status of the Mine Committees appears to be appropriate to the task in so far that they 
operate within social groups of which they themselves are part.  
 
⇒ The fact that the community themselves indicate to the Nomaindas whether they want a MC 
operating in their village, and that the MC himself volunteers knowing there are no incentives 
(except the honour), is a good measure of the willingness of villages to participate in HI’s mine 
awareness network. 
 
⇒ The fact that the majority of the MC volunteers are respected members of their communities 
indicates that mine awareness training as developed through this programme is taken seriously by 
community leaders which in turn guarantees a high level of attendance by villagers at indirect 
training sessions. 
 
⇒ Considering the social and cultural context of Afghanistan this evaluation finds that the current 
system of MC recruitment and support works well and is appropriate for settled communities. The 
current system with respect to Kuchies appears to be weak with only 5 active MC in these 
communities. If the existing recruitment and support structure for MC is not appropriate for Kuchies 
and alternative needs to be found as soon as possible. 
                                                          
22 As such it was suggested that the MCs would not be interested in acting as village volunteers on 
other issues, but the results of the questionnaires found that most were very willing to assist the 
community and NGOs in other way and with other data. This is discussed in section XXX. 
23
 Some of these ex-MCs were located during the evaluation and interviewed. Most left after serving 
their community as the MC for over a year and all left for personal or work-related reasons. 
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2.4.2 Determine the proportion between formal and informal training given by MC and assess 
the efficiency of both methods. 
 
The MC Questionnaire asked a sample selection of 60 MCs to differentiate between informal and formal 
trainings that they gave. 43% said they gave formal training. 40% said they gave informal training and 
17% said they gave both. These results are of limited use as it was impossible to subsequently test 
villagers knowledge and/or behavioural change in relation to mines and draw any conclusions 
concerning the efficiency. The case study interviews appears to support the reality that in fact most MCs 
use both informal and formal training approaches.  
 
Afghan village culture involves a high level of social gatherings (tea-drinking) and 
conversation/discussion (in homes and around the mosques). Inevitable the MC will discuss mines with 
villagers in these sort of situations. This is one of the strengths of the MC structure in so far that the 
issue of mines and UXO can be kept alive and training occurring in an informal and continuous way. To 
try to separate the informal and formal training approach would be a difficult and questionable analytical 
exercise. However it is the conviction of this evaluation that both methods are inevitably used by MCs 
and are the basis for the mine awareness message being sustainable and repeated within the village 
context. 
 
2.5 Materials and Methodlogies 
 
The  Taleban regime have implemented rules concerning television, video, games, puppets and any 
photo image or realistic representation of the human form. These rules considerably restrict the scope 
of materials available to mine awareness trainer in Afghanistan. The CBMAP has always operated 
under these restrictions and use a simple range of tools and props to promote mine awareness. 
 
Nomaindas and mine committees use the same simple kit. They have a number of wooden mine and 
UXO model that are either loose or stuck into a wooden close-able case. They also have a range of 3 
different A4 size flyers  with some warning messages and images of mine and disabled people etc. 
These item have been used since 1996. They also have a collection of stories about mine victims or 
mine-related stories that are used to stimulate discussion and group story-telling during training 
meetings. New stories are added to the collection every year. Nomaindas have tape recorders with 
taped mine awareness messages taken from the BBC drama series. These they use during their direct 
trainings. Just over 700 mine committee have been given small radios with which they are encouraged 
to hold Radio Forums, inviting people to listen to the BBC drama and then generate some discussion 
about mines and a pretext for the MC to mention some of the essential mine awareness messages. 
 
The tools, radios, mine models and flyers are all designed to reinforce the basic 8 messages of mine 
awareness that is the core of the CBMAP curriculum. This curriculum was developed in 1996/7 and has 
been upgraded over the years but essentially the message are the same. Teaching first aid messages 
to children has stopped but otherwise the methodology and materials remain the same. Nomainda are 
required to adhere to the 8 messages very closely and to teach the MCs to do the same. 
 
The current co-ordinator hopes to develop some new images on silk screens and renew the flyers in the 
next programme cycle (post-June 2001). An evaluation of the tools and methodologies used by HI 
Afghanistan (and other HI programmes) was made by the mine awareness officer from HI Lyon last 
year. The office in Kandahar still awaits the report. 
 
Radios and radio forums: 
 
For some years the BBC have been broadcasting (in Pushtoon and Farsi)a radio drama (on-going 
‘soap’ style) called New ‘Home New Life’ that has important public health messages expressed through 
the drama. Mine awareness is a main theme for the drama and the show is broadcast four times a week 
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with a new story two times a week: 8 episodes a month . They reinforce their message by making 
booklets for NGOs and Afghans to use to reiterate the messages. Handicap has been working closely 
with BBC developing the theme for mine awareness broadcasts and the accompanying booklet. 
 
The drama series have been a great success with the rural population. The CIET national mine 
awareness evaluation of 1998 found this to be the case, BBC's own frequent research show this and 
the result of this study also confirm the fact. In the case studies groups of villagers often spoke highly of 
the radio drama and seemed very familiar with the characters and events in the show. The 
questionnaire results indicated that of the 1113 people interviewed 48% listen or had listened to the 
drama. 46% considered that they understood the messages in the show and that people learned from 
the drama. The highest group of listeners were in those villages where CBMAP operates with 80% of 
the adults and 63 % children listening to the drama. About half of these had listened to the drama with 
the MC in radio forums at some point. 
 
This evaluation considers the BBC drama to be an excellent tool that they should take full advantage of 
in terms of encouraging their MC and Nomaindas to promote the drama. Currently HI have a problem 
with the radios they first purchased and distributed to 785 mine committees. They purchased small and 
cheap Chinese radios(c$3 US) that are too small for large groups, have poor reception and are not at all 
sturdy. Many are broken and unusable. This evaluation suggests that buying cheap radios is a false 
economy and that in the future better quality radios should be purchased and that radio distribution 
should be seen as an essential tool of all mine committees. A policy needs to be considered concerning 
the issue of battery provision by HI (versus the community providing their own batteries as their 
participation). 
 
Since the introduction of radio forums as part of the MCs activities in January 2000 over  63,000 people 
have had mine awareness training through the radio forums and the subsequent discussions and 
teachings that it generates. Far more people listen to the drama on their own. The potential to harness 
the high popularity of the show is considerable and HI should make this a priority. 
 
Findings of 2.5 Materials and Methodologies 
 
⇒ Considering the restrictions set by the Taleban, the current tools, materials and methodologies 
appear to serve the training staff well. Those exposed to mine awareness through this approach 
appear to be more ‘mine smart’ than those not exposed to training, but direct correlations with ‘mine 
smart’ knowledge and incident reduction can still not be made. 
 
⇒ This evaluation considers the BBC drama to be an excellent tool that they should take full 
advantage of in terms of encouraging their MC and Nomaindas to promote the drama. Its popularity 
is proven and due to HI’s involvement with BBC they are in a strong position to help guide the 
producers concerning the content of the broadcasts. 
 
⇒ Buying cheap radios is a false economy and that in the future better quality radios should be 
purchased and that radio distribution should be seen as an essential tool of all mine committees 
 
 
2.6 Community Involvement 
 
The involvement of the community in CBMAP operations should not be exaggerated and neither should 
there be unrealistic expectations. CBMAP is essentially an information transfer system that enables the 
communities to benefit from mine awareness and other mine action intervention (EOD, marking, 
prioritised clearance, victim rehabilitation..) and which enables the concerned external agencies 
understand and react to the mine problem more effectively. The community participate through 
recognition of the problem they face in respect to mines and UXO and their co-operation with the 
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volunteer representative (MC), through attending mine awareness training, and the reporting to the MC 
of any information concerning victim data, minefields and UXO sightings. 
 
Not surprisingly communities are very positive about any mine action intervention and generally the 
CBMAP has met with high co-operation from all communities it has visited in the last 5 years. Provincial 
and district authorities have also been very positive about the programme. Beyond this there are no 
tangible issue where the community can be more active in terms of participation except in the obvious 
area of changing behaviour (to minimise risk ) following the mine awareness training,  
 
2.7 Technical assistance requirements  
 
The programme appear to be operating very well as it is currently run by the Afghan co-ordinator and 
his staff, overseen by the Country Director. There has been a gap of  4 months since the last expat co-
ordinator of the CBMAP left the programme. The programme has had 5 different expatriate co-
ordinators in 5 years. This is a relatively high turn over which damages project continuity and follow-
through of new initiatives. 
 
A new expatriate co-ordinator has been recruited and is due to start working in the programme in June 
2001. It is hoped that he is a specialist in either education, training and/or communications. This is the 
technical profile required of those co-ordinating mine awareness programme. Previous mine related 
experience is less important and can be learnt in-country. Previous military experience is neither 
necessary nor appropriate.  
 
3.0 Evaluation of Sustainability 
 
This report considers the CBMAP to have established an conceptual approach and operational structure 
that allows mine awareness to be highly sustainable in a target area and population group of 
considerable size. This is already being achieve with increasing economies of scale a the project 
currently expands in Ghazni and Farah, while consolidating in Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar. The 
programme is culturally and socially appropriate in design and its structure allows a single community 
based Nomainda to monitor and interface with a large number of MCs. Mine awareness seeks to reduce 
dangerous and risk-taking practises through the teaching of ‘mine smart’ knowledge: as long as there 
are mines and UXO this is a damage limitation exercise and not a damage control exercise. There will 
never be the perfect mine awareness programme but a community based, voluntary and self-sustaining 
network of trainer and information collectors is a significant achievement that deserves recognition.  
 
Considering the different aspects of sustainability and the specific evaluation requirements set out in the 
TOR the following subject will be briefly examined. 
 
 
3.1  MC  coverage and MC reputation: 
 
There may be problems concerning the MC coverage of their communities. In many of the case studies 
(which were normally conducted in communities where there were functioning MCs) those interviewed 
in the ‘semi-structured interviews’ did not know who exactly the mine committee and neither had they 
received training from them. In the villages where MC exist and where questionnaires were conducted it 
is true that 88% of adults and 81% of children confirmed that they had received some mine awareness 
training. A weakness in the questionnaire design does not enable us to identify whether this training was 
given by the district Nomainda or by the mine committee.  
 
Due to the informal training methods of the MC, (as opposed to the formal approach of the Nomaindas 
who furthermore arrive in the village on motorbikes) the fact that he almost certainly does not describe 
himself as a ‘mine committee,’ and the fact that he may already be known as the mullah, or teacher or 
as the respected shop-keeper, the other villagers may not identify the MC to outsiders successfully. 
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They may not even describe the way the MC trains them as ‘training’ when asked in a formal 
questionnaire. This does not mean the MC is not doing his training effectively and that the knowledge of 
mine awareness is not gradually spreading throughout the village. The uncertainty here is more a 
reflection on the limitations of the evaluation and questionnaire techniques than evidence that MCs do 
not reach a large number of there communities. 
 
Nevertheless, some village are large and MCs will operate in their section of the village and normally 
use the mosque which they frequent (and its associated madrasa or school) as the venues for most 
‘training’. This automatically limits the scope of coverage for each MC and is why CBMAP has more 
than one MC in many villages. If the documented statistics  from HI are accurate they indicate that on 
average each MC has given indirect training to over 600 people. This appears to be a very high 
average, which suggests that some degree of double-counting may taking place. However when this 
average figure is divided by the number of years of programme operation and months the resulting 




Findings of 3.1  MC  coverage and MC reputation 
 
⇒ Generally this evaluation finds that the supervisors and Nomaindas need to monitor MCs more 
carefully to ensure that where there are sections of the community or village where the MC cannot 
train, they consider creating new MCs.25 Achieving maximum coverage is important. 
 
⇒ It is noted that villagers appear to associate their memory of receiving mine awareness training 
much more with the visit of the Nomainda that the informal training of the MCs. This does not 
necessarily indicate that the MCs are less successful. CBMAP will needs to look into these issues 
in more detail (through questioning villages and selected case studies) if a deeper analysis is 
needed. 
 
⇒ Issues concerning coverage and reputation of the MC are directly related to the sustainability and 
the efficiency of the programme. 
 
3.2 Assess monitoring requirements to supervise MA delivered by Mine 
Committees. 
 
The CBMAP ha developed various forms and mechanisms to monitor and test different issue and staff 
within the project including the MCs. For example they use; 
• Training Observation Forms (for Field Officers and Supervisors to monitor training given my 
Nomaindas and MCs) 
• Mine Committee Test and Evaluation Forms, ( which MCs have to pass to start in the programme.) 
• MC Assessment Forms , 
• Questionnaire to the MC, 
• Radio Monitoring Forms, 
• Training Materials Analysis Forms 
  
The frequency  of training and numbers trained (by age and gender) are well documented and the 
Nomaindas and MCs appear to be regularly checked by Field Officers and Supervisors to ensure that 
they are closely following the curriculum and remain engaging to the local population. Feedback Forms 
                                                          
24
 Clearly this is only a statistical example using averages and should not be quoted out of context. 
25 Often people link themselves to mosques and a useful guide to how many MC are needed in each 
village can be based on the number of mosques. 
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allow supervisor to give MCs and Nomaindas constructive feedback and support concerning their 
delivery of the message following assessment.  
 
 
Findings of 3.2:  Monitoring requirements to supervise MA delivered by Mine 
Committees 
 
⇒ There is a need for occasional evaluation of the coverage and success of transfer of knowledge 
among the villagers themselves. The village questionnaires conducted during this evaluation were 
the first of their kind in terms of assessing the mine smart knowledge and other issue of the 
trainees themselves. In terms of assessing the coverage of the MCs the programme needs to 
monitor villagers to establish how successful the MC is in reaching their community. The results of 
the questionnaires and in particular the case studies indicate that while almost all the MCs claim 
they are reaching all their communities, the evidence suggests their coverage is far lower. These 
aspects of the work of the MCs needs more monitoring.  
 
⇒ The monitoring of the MCs themselves by the monthly Nomainda visits and through spot checks by 
Supervisors and Field Officers testing  appear to be sufficient. It is also an effective information 
transfer opportunity for HI as during these visits the Nomainda collects village data (accidents, 
minefields and UXO) as well as training numbers. 
 
⇒ Nomaindas should be commended on their considerable dedication in visiting such a large number 
of MC every month in difficult climatic and geographical conditions but they should not be over-
burdened with too many MCs or else the quality of their monitoring will undoubtedly fall. 
 
 
3.3 The time frame required before a Mine Committee is able to fulfil its duties. 
 
After 12 years of mine survey, mine marking and mine clearance MAPA consider that they have only 
cleared 39% of all high priority land. 61% remains to be cleared. Overall, considering high and low 
priority land (low priority clearance has not begun) 40% of all mined areas are considered low priority. In 
addition to this new information about previously unrecorded mines continues to be collected by the 
CBMAP and other agencies. UXOs are another aspect of the problem (and one that claims an 
increasing, proportionately, amount of lives) which is only beginning to be addressed after an internal 
analysis in MAPA that showed that only 5% of MAPA resources were devoted to dealing with UXO 
despite the scale of the problem and high risk to the population (especially the youth).26 
 
The scale of the mine problem in Afghanistan is vast: mine clearance and EOD is very slow. A some of 
the case studies have revealed, villager can still face considerable risk even after mine clearance teams 
have performed some clearance around their village. Current tasking and prioritisation by MAPA dose 
not necessarily  result in mine/UXO free villages after a clearance team has left (see case studies 2 & 9 
in particular.)  
 
The unfortunately reality is that villagers and especially the kuchi continue to be at risk. In all the case 
studies where villagers considered their  village itself to be risk-free the population requested a 
continuation/or start of mine awareness as their people travelled into other areas regularly, they grazed 
animals far from the village and searched for wood on distant mountains or hills. Mine awareness needs 
to continue and be repeated. Mines and UXO have a long life-span and will continue to affect 
subsequent Afghan children and adults. Children born after the end of the last war are currently dying 
and being maimed. This new generation need mine awareness as will the next generation. Whether 
they get it or not will depend on the commitment of agencies to deliver it and donors to fund it. It is 
                                                          
26
 Handicap is included in the new initiative that will raise new EOD teams in existing agencies spread 
over the country ( Halo Trust, ACT, DDG, MCPA and HI) 
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therefore paramount that low-cost and sustainable systems are established to disseminate mine 
awareness and make it part of the village life and culture.  
 
 
Findings of 3.3:   Time Frame Issues 
 
⇒ The duties of a MC can  be defined  in terms of ideals or absolutes: When all the village or 
community is knowledgeable about mine awareness and avoid any risk taking behaviour and are 
able to successfully pass on this information to new comers and their new generation of children, 
then the duties to the MC may be complete. Also when there are no accidents to report and when 
all UXO and ammunition or newly identified minefields are reported then there will be no need for a 
MC. It is highly unlikely that the international community will continue to fund mine action  to reach 
these objectives.  The need to create a sustainable and cost-effective mine awareness system is 
therefore crucial. It appears that the CBMAP has developed a powerful mechanism to achieve this. 
 
⇒ The CBMAP system is evaluated to be very appropriate to facilitate a long term or short term 
involvement by HI. They have set up a low cost systems with considerable ‘economies of scale’ 
advantages that requires low staff and low maintenance.  In terms of sustainability 98% of MCs 
interviewed indicated that they would continue to act as the mine committee even if the Nomaindas 
(i.e. CBMAP) stopped to support them or visit them.  
 
⇒ Theoretically the life-span of MC can continue until the mines/UXO threat in rural areas has ended. 
More realistically HI will probable need to develop a criteria for exit from one area in order to devote 
more recourses to another province or set of districts. Criteria such as; number of accidents, 
number of minefields, their proximity to the village, number of UXO reports, assessed level of ‘mine 
smart’ knowledge in the village and how many years HI has already worked in the village would 
need to be part of the exit assessment. The interesting aspect concerning a potential exit of 
CBMAP from certain villages is that there is a high chance that the MC created there will continue 
in their role. 
 
 
3.4 The life-span of a Mine Committee and the reasons for stopping delivering MA. 
 
It must be recognised that the MCs are volunteers and unpaid. As such the CBMAP may have 
expectations of the MCs and may seek to encourage and support MCs but clearly can not obligate MC 
to perform. The reality is that there are very active MCs and others who are less active. Personal 
circumstances sometime require MC to be absent from their villages from time to time in an some cases 
they leave for many months and on rarer occasions leave the country. This should be expected when 
dealing with a volunteer corps of over 1300. It is the Nomaindas and supervisors duty to monitor the 
progress of MCs in this regard. 
 
To date very few trained MC since the start of the programme have stopped working and withdrawn. 
Those who have left the programme since 1996 are only 6% of the total trained. Some ex-MCs were 
located and questioned. All said they stopped working due to personal circumstance and all said they 
considered the continuation of mine awareness to be important. Section 2.4.1 above covers these issue 
in more detail. 
. 
Considering the period of time that many of the MCs have been operational (3-5 years) it is remarkable 
that the drop-out rate is not higher. Even with paid staff one would expect a higher turn-over over  a 
similar time period. The overall approach of the CBMAP combined with the particular social and cultural 
attitudes of rural Afghanistan appears to result in a highly appropriate and sustainable network system. 
This evaluation sees no reason for the situation to change in this regard. 
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3.5 Considering ‘Exit Strategies’. 
 
If Nomaindas are ‘servicing’ an maximum of 65 mine committees in their districts27, the cost of paying a 
Nomainda (with additional supervision and transport costs) to visit each MC every months to supervise 
the work of the MC and collect data is very low. This should be considered carefully before HI develops 
a strategy to ‘exist’ communities that may have received the CBMAP for some years. A simplistic 
division of  total project costs between current numbers of  MC indicates that MC cost approximately 
$20 a month. However by the end of 2001 for the same overall programme costs the increase of MCs 
created could reduce the costs per MC to between $10- $15 per month. This cost could fall further as 
the programme develops the number of MC. With the current structure the co-ordinator considers that 
they could comfortably service over 2,400 MCs, i.e. double the current level. 
 
It is instructive to examine the all the various benefits that accrue form this low  MC cost: 
⇒ It enables a Nomaindas to give direct training to as many members of the community (incl. kuchi) 
as possible and establish a MC. 
⇒ The established MC gives refresher training and holds radio forums repeatedly to the villagers. 
⇒ HI obtains precise information on a monthly basis about any accidents in the area . 
⇒ HI obtains precise information on a monthly basis about any UXO/ammunition in the area which will 
is passed on to MAPA but will be used by their EOD teams in the near future for direct intervention. 
⇒ HI obtains information on a monthly basis about any  previously unidentified mined areas from the 
villagers. 
⇒ HI is able to offer referral advice to mine victims in rural locations concerning medical assistance 
prosthetics and rehabilitation. 
⇒ Of course included in this ‘per-MC’ cost are the benefits of  the central and provincial offices, the 
interaction between HI Afghanistan and the wider mine action community in country (MAPA) and 
world-wide, and linkages with other initiatives (EOD, ICBL activities, Landmine Monitor,etc). 
 
Despite these considerable benefits that are obtainable over a wide are of rural Afghanistan and 
relatively low cost, ‘exit’ issues need to be raised. In the 3 provinces where CBMAP has been operating 
the longest (3-5 years) the questionnaire results indicated that  81% of adults who had not received any 
mine awareness felt that their village was directly at risk from mines . In these provinces (Helmand, 
Zabul and Kandahar) it has been assumed that the district  Nomaindas have already covered all 
affected villages with direct training and created MC where necessary. The results of the questionnaire 
raises some serious doubt over their selection process. Perhaps the resources aimed at the villages 
where MCs have been active for 3-5 years should be directed to other villages that consider themselves 
at risk but which have been ‘missed’ or ignored by the CBMAP for some reason. As mentioned in other 
sections 2.2 this indicates a weakness in allowing the Nomaindas to make the village selection at the 
district level. 
 
HI needs to examine their selection of villages, especially in areas where HI has been involved for some 
years but where there is evidence that some villages that perceive themselves to need mine awareness 
but are not receiving any. 
 
 
HI needs to develop a criteria for reducing, or curtailing  its activities in selected villages and/or districts.  
This report cannot suggest a policy but recommends that the criteria for reconsidering the status of a 
village should at least include the following: 
1. An assessment indicating that the MC is active and that ‘mine smart’ knowledge is high in the 
community. 
2. Indication that there are no reports of injuries and deaths by mines or UXO in the community. 
3. That there are no longer reports of UXO and minefields coining from the community. 
 
                                                          
27 This figure was suggested by the current national co-ordinator of CBMAP 
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If any of the above criteria is not occurring then, due to the low marginal cost of each MC, the ‘exit’ 
could be delayed. If all criteria are evident then CBMAP should consider a limited or total withdrawal of 
their contact with the village and allow the Nomainda to concentrate on other areas. In areas were there 
is very low risk and where MCs appear to be active and able to complete form, HI may want to consider 
that the Nomaindas only visit the village on a less frequent quarterly basis for example. At the moment 
the project implementation is somewhat black and white with villages fully integrated in the network or 
totally outside it. This does not allow for the subtleties of reality where  different villagers in CBMAP 
have different risk levels. HI needs to develop its ‘servicing’ or contact with MCs according to different 
criteria. 
 
Findings of 3.5   Concerning Exit Strategies 
 
⇒ The development of the MC structure has not been maximised with the existing, funded structure 
and there can be increase with some effort but little extra cost. HI should try to maximise the impact 
of created MC before withdrawing, or moving to other provinces 
 
⇒ The MC structure yields at low cost a wide range of important information that would otherwise be 
costly to obtain. 
 
⇒ Nevertheless and exist strategy does need to be developed, not for theoretical reason but practical 
reasons: to allow HI to work in other area and meet unmet needs within the provinces they cover. 
Also to allow the MCs to be sustainable and ‘free-standing’. 
 
 
⇒ Due to an identified dubious selection process where the Nomaindas have chosen the district MC, 
HI needs to combine a reduction of attention  in areas where they have worked for some years with 
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Summary of all findings with specific recommendations and 
conclusions: 
The findings here are summarised for ease of reading and to relate 
recommendations to specific findings and some general conclusions. 
 
 
Findings of 1.1   Achievements as set against stated goals, aims and objectives. 
 
⇒ Specific results  
With respect to these specific results the CBMAP has, between August 1999 and April 2001 (two 
months short of the contract period with the EC) : 
 Trained (direct and indirect) in mine awareness over 736, 000 villagers and pastoral nomads 
(Kuchie). This is an over achievement of 350% above the target number. 
 Created 542 new mine committee. This is an over achievement of 135% above the target level. 
 Documented and collected 1664 ammunition reports from affected villages. An over achievement of  
277%. 
These achievements are very commendable and illustrate that the system in place to achieve these 
different project output are working well and to far higher levels than expected. Possibly they also show 
that HI set their targets low or are not aware themselves of the capacity of their system to generate 
these results. It should be clear that these levels of achievement will probably not be repeated in the 
future in the same areas: There will be a finite limit to how many Mine Committees (MCs) a province 
needs and how many people need training. Equally there will be a limit to how many ammunition reports 
HI will receive from the same areas over time.  
 
⇒ Reducing mine incidents 
With respect to the stated goal of reducing mine incidents in the project area it must be said that 
seeking to establish a direct correlation between changes in mine/UXO incidents and mine awareness 
dissemination is problematic and misleading. By isolating mine awareness training as a single factor 
affecting mine/UXO incidents this evaluation would be ignoring the fact that mine / UXO incidents are 
the result of a complex interplay of physical, seasonal and attitudinal factors. There are serious limiting 
factors in assessing this objective. This has also been found to be the case in other countries where an 
evaluation of mine awareness impact has been attempted as well as in a previous national mine 
awareness evaluation (CIET 1998) in Afghanistan. Nevertheless some findings concerning this central 
CBMAP objective and these can be found below in section 1.4. 
 
⇒ Sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network 
Concerning the creation of a sustainable mine awareness capacity and mine information network, the 
programme has developed an approach that has proved to be sustainable (to date) and has resulted in 
an effective mine information network that almost entirely covers mine affected districts of southern  
Afghanistan, including Ghazni to the east and Farah to the west. In addition it appears that the network 
of information gathering and mine awareness dissemination will be sustainable in the long term due to 
the structure of the CBMAP and the particular social and cultural conditions of rural Afghanistan. This is 
discussed throughout the report and particularly section 3. 
 
⇒ Information transfer network 
Currently the programme covers hundreds of villages in 41 districts in the five provinces. Three districts 
regarded as mine affected and needing mine awareness (according to HI’s internal needs assessment) 
are not yet covered. The network of mine committees continues to grow every month increasing 
CBMAP’s coverage. The approach currently used for this information transfer from HI to villagers (i.e. 
mine awareness) and from villagers to the mine action community ( victim data and munitions reports 
via HI) is judged to be an extraordinarily effective network in terms of reaching a large amount of rural 
people through a relatively low-cost and low-maintenance staffing structure. The details of the level of 
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effectiveness of this mine awareness approach, and the substance, reliability and end use of the 
information network is evaluated in various sections below. 
 
Conclusion: As the rest of the study will illustrate, the CBMAP is clearly meeting its targets and 
aims very well in terms of measurable indicators. Where the indicators are not measurable there 
is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest the programme is successful in achieving a 
sustainable methodology and which transfers information but it cannot be proved that CBMAP 
is directly reducing accidents and injury. 
 
Findings of 1.2.1: Statistical comparison between villages in terms of ‘mine smart’ 
knowledge 
 
⇒ In terms of ‘mine smart’ knowledge, based on the key, repeated messages of CBMAP, those 
villagers within Handicap’s mine awareness programme clearly have a higher knowledge than 
those outside the programme. The kuchi , some of whom had received some direct training scored 
a little higher than those communities that had received no training at all. 
 
⇒ Many of the questions relating to mine awareness in general are common sense and therefore it is 
not surprising that those not trained by the CBMAP still scored relatively highly overall (70%) on 
mine awareness questions. ( e.g. When asked whether ‘there is ever a situation where it is good to 
touch a mine.’ extremely few people would respond to the affirmative whether they had been 
trained or not!) 
 
⇒ It is pertinent that those villagers outside of CBMAP activities scored lower on the more demanding 
questions concerning recognition of minefields, how to recognise mine marking, natural signs and 
what are the safest activities when you find yourself in an unknown or mined area. The mine smart 
knowledge concerning these kinds of questions require a range of responses and need to be taught 
for people to be aware of them. Where HI has been training the knowledge is significantly higher on 
these issues, particularly when comparing the children. 
 
⇒ We can conclude that the statistics from the results of the questionnaires illustrate that adults and 
children within CBMAP possess significantly more ‘mine smart’ knowledge.  This is a positive 
affirmation of the programmes success in transferring ‘mine smart’ knowledge. It does not , 
however, illustrate to what level this knowledge may  influences changes away from risk-taking 
behaviour. 
 
Conclusion: The statistics indicate that people exposed to mine awareness through the direct 
and indirect methodology do develop  higher  levels of mine smart knowledge . The system can 
be said to be successful in this regard. 
 
 
Findings 1.2.2:    Gender separation  
 
⇒ A very small percentage of women receive mine awareness through CBMAP. Although there are 
low levels of accidents among women they should have access to mine awareness education. 
Islamic culture and the particular interpretation by the Taleban regime currently restricts this. 
 
⇒ A greater number of girls have access to mine awareness but it is still far less that the number of 
boys. CBMAP can take advantage of the access to pre-pubescent girls and offer mine awareness 
training to this group where possible. 
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⇒ Village boys are generally about 10% more ‘mine smart’ than girls (according to the questionnaire 
results) whether they have received mine awareness training or not. Kuchi girls and boys were 
found to be about equal in terms of 'mine smart' knowledge. 
 
⇒ In villages where CBMAP operates girls scored well on questions concerning touching and contact 
with mine/UXO but weak on the more practical situational questions. 
 
Recommendation 1: 
That HI continues to strive to reach as many girls and women as possible. Today's girls are 
tomorrow's women. Nomaindas and MCs should be encouraged in this regard. HI should 
continue to examine alternative approaches that may enable them to teach women more 
(husband and wife teams etc). 
 
Findings of 1.3: Impact of training on behavioural change 
 
⇒ The evidence from the  210 adult villagers and 76 adult kuchi interviews indicates that people 
themselves regard mine awareness as having changed their behaviour in relation to mines/UXO. 
They value mine awareness and want regular refresher indirect training as they see it as being 
linked to safer behaviour around mines/UXO. 
 
⇒ The Mine Committees questioned for this evaluation (60 in 5 provinces) all claim that their 
communities have changed their behaviour towards mine/UXO to some degree. They list  particular 
changes of activities as evidence of this. If their claims are accurate this is a positive indicator that 
mine awareness is having an impact in this regard. 
 
⇒ The statistical data in one province (Helmand) strongly indicates a big reduction in injuries and 
deaths between 1996-2000. Within this data the number of child-victims due to playing and 
tampering also greatly reduced as a proportion of the total. This could indicate that CBMA has been 
successful at some level, but unfortunately data from other provinces that have also been receiving 
CBMA for some years do not indicate similar trends. The data is too weak to draw reliable 
conclusions.  
 
⇒ That the successful development of large amounts of ammunitions reports from villagers through 
the MCs cannot be used as a indication of behavioural change, even though there is strong 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that people no longer touch items and make and effort to report 
them to the MC as a result of the presence and trainings of the MCs. This is a positive indicator of 
safer practices resulting from the project. 
 
⇒ That the measurement of behavioural change continues to be a challenge to those implementing 
and evaluating mine awareness where no reliable baseline victim data or behavioural analysis 
exists. Without these no serious conclusions can be drawn during or following programme 
implementation. 
 
Recommendation  2: 
To measure behavioural change HI will have to maintain more rigorous data collection 
concerning victims of UXO and mines. In addition a system to document behaviour before and 
after HI interventions should be established. There is still a chance to start such a baseline in 
Ghazni and any new provinces. Without these tools HI will never be able to measure these 
central aspects of their programme. 
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Findings for 1.4.1  Poor Data 
 
⇒ What this means is that MAPA (and its implementing partners including HI) have not realised, and 
therefore have not set as a priority over the last 12 years of operations, the considerable power of 
victim data as a planning tool to direct humanitarian mine action intervention. Neither have they or 
other mine action agencies recognised the critical need to establish a baseline data in terms of 
victim data in order monitor progress. The central aim of humanitarian mine action is, presumably, 
the relief of the threat of mines for the population and not simply the clearance of land. 
 
⇒ From a national point of view it is clear that the collection of reliable data is in a very poor state and 
the current dependency on national data from the ICRC is seriously flawed. Any quotations of 
changes in injury/death  levels in recent years in Afghanistan must therefore be resisted as there is 
no method of substantiation. People are talking about a significant drop in casualty rates but there 
is no reliable data to support this at the national level. A rigorous system needs to be put in place 
as soon as possible along the lines of the HI proposal of 2000. Further discussion of this is beyond 
the scope of this evaluation. 
 
Conclusion: The establishment of a national systematic and dedicated service for victim data 
collection is essential in Afghanistan, as soon as possible. 
 
Findings of 1.4.2  Constraints to finding correlations 
 
⇒ Data collection of mine and UXO victims in Afghanistan is poor and has been neglected for may 
years. The low commitment to data collection is indicative of a lack of awareness of how important 
this data is to prioritising and planning mine action intervention as well a providing a basis for 
programme evaluation. 
 
⇒ HI have created the basis for a good data-collecting network in selected provinces but have not 
processed the information consistently and have not prioritised this aspect of their work among their 
staff. Nevertheless victim data has been reported by HI every month in their reports and submitted 
to MAPA, despite MAPA’s repeated failure to manage and process this information in their own 
reports or publications. 
 
⇒ A correlation between CBMAP and changes in victim data can not be made. The available data is 
ambiguous and because it lacks consistency no conclusions can be made. There is no statistical 
evidence that accidents reduce where CBMAP operates. This does not, however mean that it is not 
happening, just we can not show it statistically. If data is collected in areas where CBMAP do not 
operate (and which are mine/UXO affected) it may be possible to illustrate, in future years, that the 
impact of CBMAP reduces accidents. At this stage it is impossible. 
 
⇒ Even where reliable data-bases of victims exist (only Cambodia at present) there is no 
substantiated evidence that mine awareness or any activity of mine action directly leads to mine 
accident reductions. In a post-conflict and rehabilitation situation there are simply too many other 
factors that account for these changes and mine action activities can rarely be isolated as the main 
causal factor of change.  
 
Recommendation  3: 
HI makes every effort to maintain a consistent and systematic coverage of the 41 districts where 
it works in terms of victim data collection. Supervisors and Nomaindas needs to understand the 
importance of this. Furthermore that it seeks funding as a matter of priority for the Mine Victim 
Information System for which it wrote a proposal approximately 16 months ago. Not only would 
this provide an important contribution to mine action in Afghanistan but would increase HIs 
credibility. 
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Findings for all 1.5:  Capacity and motivation assessment of direct and indirect 
mine awareness trainers. 
⇒ The Nomainda –based system is highly effective at developing a pyramidal structure with fast 
expansion capacity for information gathering as well as mine awareness dissemination. 
⇒ Nomaindas perform a central task in the CBMAP under difficult conditions. Their determination and 
continuity should be commended. 
⇒ The selection and recruitment of MCs appears to be appropriate and the concept of using only 
village volunteers is a central aspect of HI's concept in CBMAP. 
⇒ The ability of MCs to reach all members of their community must not be exaggerated. It is clear this 
is not the case and remedial attention is required by HI to address this deficiency. 
⇒ The motivation of MCs is primarily religious and humanitarian. Afghanistan may be a unique 
context in which a system of this nature can flourish. Possibly not replicable in other countries. 
⇒ The effectiveness of this 'information transfer system' could be harnesses for other humanitarian 
concerns outside of mines. 
⇒ HI's failure to develop a different structure to address the issue of meeting the needs of the Kuchi 
represents a lost opportunity and should be corrected . 
⇒ The potential for expansion of the HI system is considerable. 
⇒ HI's role in their current 5 provinces will change over time as they consolidate the programme: 
'production' figures will cease to be meaningful as a measure of the programmes' success and 
dynamism. 
⇒ Measure of the success of the programme needs to focus more on change of behaviour, increase 
in mine smart knowledge and clear reduction in numbers of preventable accidents.  
 
Conclusions: That the current village volunteer system is highly effective, sustainable and 
appropriate in the Afghan context. HI should remain committed to this approach, expand it 
where possible and assist other agencies to see the benefits of this approach. 
 
Recommendation 4: 
That HI immediately instruct the Nomaindas and supervisors to begin checking how much of 
their designated community the MCs actually have contact with. In areas where the risk is still 
high and it is found that the MC do not reach a high number of the population new MCs should 
be created. 
 
Recommendation  5: 
HI must develop a new approach to dealing with Kuchi groups that are moving about the south 
of Afghanistan but are missed by the MC system. They are the most vulnerable sections of the 
community and sustain a high proportion of the accidents. HI needs to prioritise this group as 
soon as possible. 
 
Findings of 1.6 Community perceptions and expectations of mine awareness 
interventions. 
 
⇒ The perception of the vast majority of the communities where CBMAP operates is highly supportive 
of the existence and continuation of mine awareness training. HI have clearly developed a 
methodology and approach which is both acceptable and perceived as relevant to communities. 
 
⇒ Communities indicate a strong desire for mine awareness to continue and with frequency. This 
suggests that there is a strong basis for the sustainability of the programme. 
 
⇒ That the kuchis have a high interest in receiving more mine awareness and due to their uniquely 
vulnerable status in Afghanistan in relation to mines HI should put more emphasis into providing 
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kuchis with systematic mine awareness training in stead of the ad hoc visits by Nomaindas and 
MCs. 
 
Findings of 1.7: HI/CBMAP as part of the overall Mine Acton Programme for 
Afghanistan(MAPA) 
 
⇒ Strategically and operationally it is important for HI to remain a participating member of MAPA 
despite the fact that the programme has felt few direct benefits in terms of mine awareness 
ideology or shared experience from other mine awareness agencies and MAPA itself. 
 
⇒ That the volunteer network in many hundreds of villages in affected areas gives HI a  high capacity 
for valuable information transfer . This can be seen in the high levels of trainees as well as the 
victim data information and ammunition reports which are useful to MAPA. 
 
⇒ That HI’s link through the RMAC with EOD teams in other agencies has enabled ammunition 
reports to be addressed in the past. Due to the high number of requests generated there is a need 
for more EOD teams and that HI’s plan to develop 2 new EOD teams in 2001 is commendable, if 
not overdue. 
 
⇒ That despite the disappointing standard of victim data collection and processing nationally, HI is 
establishing a solid basis and is well placed to improve the data collected in its regions 
substantially. That it should continue to submit all victim data to MAPA as it tries to improve its 
management of this data.In this regard HI should vigorously promote the establishment of the 
national data collection plan as laid out in the AMVIS proposal written in 2000. 
 
Conclusion: That HI can afford to raise it profile and effectiveness in mine action in Afghanistan. 
It has a structure and a credibility and 6 years of experience. The recent decision to establish 
EOD teams is an excellent development. Establishing a national database would also be of great 
value.  
 
Recommendation  6: 
HI is a mine action NGO and therefore should not restrict itself to certain sub-sectors like mine 
awareness within mine action. The aim is to reduce injuries and clear  away the threat.. HI 
should take a more proactive approach and be less hesitant in this regard. After 12 years of 
mine action in Afghanistan the accident rate are still unacceptably high. 
 
Findings of  2.1: Project structure and resources 
 
⇒ This evaluation finds the management structure to be simple and effective, with a low level of paid 
staff able to control a network that benefits 41 districts, thousands of villages and reaches hundreds 
of thousands of people . The Nomaindas and supervisors should be commended for their 
dedication in particularly difficult geographical and climatic conditions, having to traverse vast areas  
of the 41 districts they cover in Southern Afghanistan. 
 
⇒ The current structure has considerable potential for further expansion in terms of reaching more 
communities with mine awareness (creating more MCs) without increasing the number of paid staff.   
The current co-ordinator feels that  the number of MC could double (giving each Nomainda and 
average of 65 MC each) without increasing the staff number or structure. These ‘economies of 
scale’ are a major benefit of the CBMAP design 
 
Recommendation  7: 
That considering the economies of scale with the CBMAP system, HI seeks to maximise its 
capacity within the current structure by maximising the number of MCs under each Nomainda.  
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Findings of 2.2: Project coverage and selection mechanisms 
 
⇒ This evaluation realises that this section is inconclusive and sheds little light on the scope of HI’s 
coverage. Nevertheless it is clear that in the 5 provinces there are 38 Nomaindas working in the 
most affected districts. Their duty is to give direct training throughout the district in mine affected 
villages and kuchi camps. To what extent this is occurring cannot be measured at this stage except 
by the considerable numbers of trainees in all locations and the establishment of large numbers of 
MCs (over 1150) and visits made to at least 4,200 villages in the last 6 years. 
 
⇒ As indicated there is a weakness in the selection system concerning villages within districts. HI 
needs to have a more rigorous process of ensuring that other villagers that are not currently 
included in the work of Nomainda and MC are not at risk. The questionnaire result appear to show 
that many people living in such areas consider themselves at risk and in need of mine awareness. 
 
Recommendaion  8: 
That HI reviews the selection system at the district level as soon as possible to ensure that 
villages that regard themselves at risk have not been left out of the mine awareness network. 
Evidence from the questionnaires suggest this is the case. Village selection of MCs should not 
and cannot just be left to the Nomaindas. 
 
Findings of 2.3: Staff monitoring and training 
 
⇒ The current structure of monitoring and training appear to be working well and meeting the needs of 
different levels of management. The frequent 3-monthly training for Field Officers, Supervisors and 
Nomainda is judged to be very positive in terms of keeping a close control of standards, monitoring 
problems as they arise, and developing a strong team spirit. 
 
⇒ This evaluation found that more control was needed concerning the understanding  by field staff of 
the importance of coverage and village selection. This is discussed in more detail above in section 
2.2. 
 
Findings of 2.4.1  Status & function of the Mine Committee 
 
⇒ The social status of the Mine Committees appears to be appropriate to the task in so far that they 
operate within social groups of which they themselves are part.  
 
⇒ The fact that the community themselves indicate to the Nomaindas whether they want a MC 
operating in their village, and that the MC himself volunteers knowing there are no incentives 
(except the honour), is a good measure of the willingness of villages to participate in HI’s mine 
awareness network. 
 
⇒ The fact that the majority of the MC volunteers are respected members of their communities 
indicates that mine awareness training as developed through this programme is taken seriously by 
community leaders which in turn guarantees a high level of attendance by villagers at indirect 
training sessions. 
 
⇒ Considering the social and cultural context of Afghanistan this evaluation finds that the current 
system of MC recruitment and support works well and is appropriate for settled communities. The 
current system with respect to Kuchies appears to be weak with only 5 active MC in these 
communities. If the existing recruitment and support structure for MC is not appropriate for Kuchies 
and alternative needs to be found as soon as possible. 
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Findings of  2.5 Materials and Methodologies 
 
⇒ Considering the restrictions set by the Taleban, the current tools, materials and methodologies 
appear to serve the training staff well. Those exposed to mine awareness through this approach 
appear to be more ‘mine smart’ than those not exposed to training, but direct correlations with ‘mine 
smart’ knowledge and incident reduction can still not be made. 
 
⇒ This evaluation considers the BBC drama to be an excellent tool that they should take full 
advantage of in terms of encouraging their MC and Nomaindas to promote the drama. Its popularity 
is proven and due to HI’s involvement with BBC they are in a strong position to help guide the 
producers concerning the content of the broadcasts. 
 
⇒ Buying cheap radios is a false economy and that in the future better quality radios should be 
purchased and that radio distribution should be seen as an essential tool of all mine committees. 
 
Recommendation 9: 
HI takes full advantage of the BBC dramas and make it an immediate priority to provide decent 
radios and batteries to support and promote village forums among as many villages as possible. 
It may also be a good approach for Kuchi. In terns of per-village cost it is a very low-cost way of 
enabling people to hear mine awareness (and other public health messages). The cheapest 
radios should be avoided. 
 
Findings of 3.1  MC  coverage and MC reputation 
 
⇒ Generally this evaluation finds that the supervisors and Nomaindas need to monitor MCs more 
carefully to ensure that where there are sections of the community or village where the MC cannot 
train, they consider creating new MCs. Achieving maximum coverage is important. 
 
⇒ It is noted that villagers appear to associate their memory of receiving mine awareness training 
much more with the visit of the Nomainda that the informal training of the MCs. This does not 
necessarily indicate that the MCs are less successful. CBMAP will needs to look into these issues 
in more detail (through questioning villages and selected case studies) if a deeper analysis is 
needed. 
 
⇒ Issues concerning coverage and reputation of the MC are directly related to the sustainability and 
the efficiency of the programme. 
 
Conclusion: MC coverage and reputation appear to be of a high standard which bodes well for 
the sustainability and effectiveness of the programme. 
 
 
Findings of 3.2:  Monitoring requirements to supervise MA delivered by Mine 
Committees 
 
⇒ There is a need for occasional evaluation of the coverage and success of transfer of knowledge 
among the villagers themselves. The village questionnaires conducted during this evaluation were 
the first of their kind in terms of assessing the mine smart knowledge and other issue of the 
trainees themselves. In terms of assessing the coverage of the MCs the programme needs to 
monitor villagers to establish how successful the MC is in reaching their community. The results of 
the questionnaires and in particular the case studies indicate that while almost all the MCs claim 
they are reaching all their communities, the evidence suggests their coverage is far lower. These 
aspects of the work of the MCs needs more monitoring.  
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⇒ The monitoring of the MCs themselves by the monthly Nomainda visits and through spot checks by 
Supervisors and Field Officers testing appear to be sufficient. It is also an effective information 
transfer opportunity for HI as during these visits the Nomainda collects village data (accidents, 
minefields and UXO) as well as training numbers. 
 
⇒ Nomaindas should be commended on their considerable dedication in visiting such a large number 
of MC every month in difficult climatic and geographical conditions but they should not be over-
burdened with too many MCs or else the quality of their monitoring will undoubtedly fall. 
 
Recommendation 10: 
That, at least every year, HI try to conduct village based questionnaires to find out how 
successful the mine awareness message transfer is going using the nomaindas and MCs. The 
aim of the programme is to effect this transfer and that this in turn should effect a change in 
behaviour. HI must have an internal mechanism to monitor the progress of these issues. 
 
Findings of 3.3:   Time Frame Issues 
 
⇒ The duties of a MC can  be defined  in terms of ideals or absolutes: When all the village or 
community is knowledgeable about mine awareness and avoid any risk taking behaviour and are 
able to successfully pass on this information to new comers and their new generation of children, 
then the duties to the MC may be complete. Also when there are no accidents to report and when 
all UXO and ammunition or newly identified minefields are reported then there will be no need for a 
MC. It is highly unlikely that the international community will continue to fund mine action  to reach 
these objectives.  The need to create a sustainable and cost-effective mine awareness system is 
therefore crucial. It appears that the CBMAP has developed a powerful mechanism to achieve this. 
 
⇒ The CBMAP system is evaluated to be very appropriate to facilitate a long term or short term 
involvement by HI. They have set up a low cost systems with considerable ‘economies of scale’ 
advantages that requires low staff and low maintenance.  In terms of sustainability 98% of MCs 
interviewed indicated that they would continue to act as the mine committee even if the Nomaindas 
(i.e. CBMAP) stopped to support them or visit them.  
 
⇒ Theoretically the life-span of MC can continue until the mines/UXO threat in rural areas has ended. 
More realistically HI will probable need to develop a criteria for exit from one area in order to devote 
more resources to another province or set of districts. Criteria such as; number of accidents, 
number of minefields, their proximity to the village, number of UXO reports, assessed level of ‘mine 
smart’ knowledge in the village and how many years HI has already worked in the village would 
need to be part of the exit assessment. The interesting aspect concerning a potential exit of 
CBMAP from certain villages is that there is a high chance that the MC created there will continue 
in their role. 
 
Findings for 3.5 Considering ‘Exit Strategies’. 
 
⇒ The development of the MC structure has not been maximised with the existing, funded structure 
and there can be increase with some effort but little extra cost. HI should try to maximise the impact 
of created MC before withdrawing, or moving to other provinces 
 
⇒ The MC structure yields at low cost a wide range of important information that would otherwise be 
costly to obtain. 
 
⇒ Nevertheless and exist strategy does need to be developed, not for theoretical reason but practical 
reasons: to allow HI to work in other area and meet unmet needs within the provinces they cover. 
Also to allow the MCs to be sustainable and ‘free-standing’. 
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⇒ Due to an identified dubious selection process where the Nomaindas have chosen the district MC, 
HI needs to combine a reduction of attention  in areas where they have worked for some years with 





The criteria for reconsidering the status of a village should at least include the following: 
1. An assessment indicating that the MC is active and that ‘mine smart’ knowledge is high in 
the community. 
2. Indication that there are no reports of injuries and deaths by mines or UXO in the 
community. 
3. That there are no longer reports of UXO and minefields coining from the community. 
 
If any of the above criteria is not occurring then, due to the low marginal cost of each MC, the 
‘exit’ could be delayed. If all criteria are evident then CBMAP should consider a limited or total 
withdrawal of their contact with the village and allow the Nomainda to concentrate on other 
areas. HI needs to develop its ‘servicing’ or contact with MCs according to different criteria. 
 
 
 
 
